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CHEVRON, STATE FARM AND THE EPA IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS DURING THE 1990S

I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, we analyzed how environmental policy, primarily as formulated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), had fared in federal court during the first two decades
of the Environmental Era.1 Our primary interest then was to determine how emerging
environmental values were being accommodated by federal courts when those courts reviewed
administrative actions by EPA and other agencies charged with new environmental
responsibilities. This Article updates, extends and refines our earlier work using a different
methodology and with related, but also different, objectives.
In this Article we analyze how EPA and the federal courts interact under two broad
aspects of judicial review. First, we study EPA’s and the courts’ interpretations of the agency’s
statutory authority, with special emphasis on how the agency has fared under the Chevron2
doctrine. Second, we study how well EPA’s rulemaking satisfies the requirements of “reasoned
decisionmaking” as set forth in Overton Park,3 State Farm4 and other decisions. The Article
thus focuses on how the Environmental Protection Agency has fared under judicial review, rather
than on how environmental values have been treated by the federal courts. In subsequent work,
we plan to use these same data to return to this question, which was the subject of our earlier
work, an effort that will include examining the ways in which political preferences of the judges
affect their decisions.5
II. OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA SET
We have reviewed all of the cases in the federal appellate courts in which EPA or its

1

Robert L. Glicksman and Christopher H. Schroeder, “EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics,” 54 Law & Contemp. Prob. 249 (Autumn 1991).
2

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

3

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

4

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

5

See infra n. 56 for some citations to this growing literature.
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Administrator appeared as a party, and which were decided between January 1, 1991 and August
1, 1999.6 Our initial Westlaw search produced 377 appellate decisions during the study period
in which the EPA was a named party. Some of these decisions provide little or no information
other than the parties and the disposition of the matter.7 Where indicated below, we retained
these decisions when calculating disposition rates, although they necessarily drop out of the
analysis when we turn to studying substantive or procedural decisions made by EPA in the course
of conducting primary agency business. Still other decisions resolved disputes that we viewed as
entirely internal to the litigation process, such as decisions on motions to consolidate appeals,
motions to stay mandates temporarily, motions for rehearing en banc, consensual motions to
dismiss as moot and the like. Because we were interested in the interaction between EPA and the
courts when some element of agency decisionmaking on environmental issues was being
challenged, we excluded these decisions from any further analysis. Excluding these litigationrelated dispositions left us with 336 decisions.
In addition to analyzing these cases from the 1990s, we also sampled cases from the
1980s by identifying all the cases in the federal appellate courts in which EPA or its
Administrator appeared as a party, and which were decided between January 1, 1986 and January
1, 1988. This is not a random sample of 1980s cases, but it does capture the entirety of two years
relatively soon after State Farm and Chevron had been decided. This sample provides us with
one measure of whether the interaction between the EPA and the appellate courts under the
Chevron and reasoned decision making doctrines has changed over time. Following the same
procedures for our 1980s period as we did for the 1990s search produced a set of 80 decisions
after winnowing. Table 1 presents the overall comparison.

6

The beginning date was the cut off date of our earlier study. The end date was simply
the time at which we had to cease collecting cases in order to begin analyzing them. While the
statistical measures in this Article are all drawn from this data set, in discussing different issues
we occasionally will refer to significant decisions outside of these time boundaries, such as
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
7

Many of these are issued as unpublished Table Decisions. During our study period, the
appellate courts decided 77 of the cases involving EPA via Table Decisions.
-4-

Outcomes of Challenges to EPA in the Courts of Appeals
EPA
Prevails

Reversed &
Remanded

Remanded

1986-87

48

28

4

1990s

227

70

39

df = 2, X2 = 8.7922, P-value = 0.0123

Table 1
Several characteristics of the entire data set of 1990s cases merit some consideration
before we turn to more detailed analysis. First, the reversal rates in our cases from the nineties
and the eighties show that EPA has fared somewhat better in the nineties, and that these
differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In our two-year sample of
1986-87 cases, EPA prevailed 60% of the time, it was reversed and remanded 35% of the time,
and just remanded 5% of the time. In the 1990s, the comparable figures are 67%, 21%, and 12%.
These figures suggest that the “Chevron effect” – an increase in affirmances due to more
deference to agency determinations – which some thought might decline as the passage of time
reduced the impact of the opinion – has in fact persisted into the 1990s, at least as regards EPA.8
Second, the increased percentages of remand-only decisions are consistent with the
observations of administrative law scholars that the D.C. Circuit in particular has increased its
use of the technique of remanding without reversing, a procedure that can permit EPA to correct
errors while much of the challenged rule remains in effect.
If we disaggregate these figures, which include both adjudications and rulemakings, to
focus exclusively on rulemaking challenges, they also indicate that EPA is distinctive among
federal administrative agencies. Of the 336 cases in the nineties, 33% of the total (111) consisted
of challenges to rulemaking. This is almost identical to the proportion of rules in our 1986-87
sample, in which 34% (27/80), were rulemaking challenges. One source for comparing these
figures with other agencies is the Schuck and Elliott study of the effect of the Chevron decision

8

Schuck & Elliott raised this as a possibility in 1990. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, “To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Administrative Law,” 1990 Duke L.J.
984 (1990). Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, “Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions,” 44 Duke L.J. 1051, 1069-70 (1995) (citing
figures showing declining rates of deference in Supreme Court and in the courts of appeals).
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on the courts of appeals.9 In the course of their analysis, Schuck and Elliott estimated the overall
distribution of challenges to rules and to adjudications in the periods they sampled. Summing
across all administrative agencies, they found that rulemaking challenges comprised just 1% of
the challenges to agency action in 1965, 12.3% of the total in 1975, and 9.4% of all challenges in
1984-85.10 Thus, challenges to EPA rules in the eighties and nineties were a much larger
proportion of total appellate decisions involving the agency than was the case with respect to
agencies overall during any period that Schuck and Elliott examined. This difference is quite
likely due to the relatively greater amount of rulemaking activity undertaken by EPA compared
to other federal agencies.
A check of all final rules issued by EPA in the 1990s shows that rulemaking activity by
EPA increased in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.11 At first glance, this seems inconsistent
with the so-called ossification effect, about which much has been written in recent years.12 The
ossification effect is hypothesized as a consequence of aggressive judicial review, which prompts
agencies to go through increasingly burdensome procedures in preparing final rules in order to
guard against judicial reversal. As a result, scholars have hypothesized, agencies will tend to
shift their emphasis from rulemaking to other forms of administrative action whenever those
alternatives impose fewer costs on the agency and hold more promise for being sustained against
legal challenges. The leading study of this effect is the Harfst and Mashaw work on the National
Highway Transportation Safety Agency (NHTSA).13 Harfst and Mashaw concluded that the
result of a series of reversals of NHTSA auto safety rules has been to move the agency away
from rulemaking and toward adjudicative recall proceedings.
EPA certainly does undertake a considerable amount of adjudication, in addition to
issuing an appreciable number of documents that have not gone through the notice-and-comment

9

Schuck & Elliott, note 8, above.

10

Unfortunately, the Schuck and Elliott data do not break out EPA separately, so no
direct comparison of our EPA-specific findings with their data has been possible.
11

Estimates of the gross number of rules issued by EPA also bear out the hypothesis that
EPA has not responded to the ossification problem by appreciably shifting away from
rulemaking. A simple Westlaw search in the Federal Register database for all final rules issued
by the EPA in the eighties and nineties returned a total of 2761 rules in the eighties and 3553 in
the nineties.
12

E.g., Thomas O. McGarity, “Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the Rulemaking
Process,” 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, “Two Problems in Administrative Law:
Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency
Rulemaking,” 1988 Duke L.J. 300.
13

Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1990).
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rulemaking process and yet contain important policy guidance,14 but our summary statistics
indicate that EPA continues to issue a substantial number of rules as well. The nature of the
statutory responsibilities that have been imposed on EPA often mean that rulemaking is
unavoidable, regardless of how burdensome it may be. In most of the statutes that EPA
administers, Congress has established basic environmental policy with respect to air, water, solid
waste and other pollutants, sometimes in great detail, but almost always in ways that are
incomplete until EPA has enacted rules and regulations translating that policy into administrable
instructions. Congress, for instance, has declared that automobiles must meet certain emissions
limitations before they can be marketed in the United States by means of a statute providing that
“The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any
air pollutant from ... new motor vehicles.”15 For the prohibitions on the sale of non-conforming
motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act to be effective, the EPA must first issue such
regulations.16 In the Air Act as in the other statutes EPA administers, Congress has laid out the
framework for regulation, but regulation remains incomplete until EPA has supplied further
details and implementing instructions. Overall, the statutes EPA administers are laced with
responsibilities and actions that EPA cannot exercise except through issuing rules.
The next Part addresses issues regarding EPA’s interpretations of its statutory authority,
while Part IV addresses issues regarding the fact finding, inference drawing, and policy decisions
made in the course of implementing that authority.
III. EPA AND CHEVRON
Interestingly, the Supreme Court frequently renders statutory interpretation decisions
without expressly invoking the Chevron doctrine.17 Be that as it may, the early suggestion by
Professor Merrill and others that the lower courts might also begin to disregard Chevron once
they became cognizant of the high court’s uneven use of the doctrine appears not to have been
borne out over time.18 Instead, Judge Wald offered sound advice ten years ago when she told

14

See James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, “Strategic Regulators and the
Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating
Hazardous Waste,” 57 L. & Contemp. Prob. 111 (1994).
15

16

17

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
42 U.S.C. § 7522(a).
Thomas Merrill, “Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,” 101 Yale L.J. 969

(1992).
18

Merrill, note 17, at 984; accord, Paul Caron, “Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your
Babies Grow up to be Tax Lawyers,” 13 Va. Tax Rev. 517, 562 (1994).
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administrative lawyers preparing briefs to her court to “think Chevron.”19
Our study confirms that the courts of appeals view Chevron as the authoritative template
for conducting judicial review of statutory interpretation. Explicit invocation of the Chevron
framework was nearly universal in cases involving challenges to statutory interpretations. In 119
separate decisions raising such challenges, Chevron was cited in 102, or 86% of them. Of the
seventeen cases in our study not citing Chevron, only 3 were cases in which Chevron deference
was clearly appropriate. As for the rest, half (8) were decisions interpreting statutes governing
the availability of judicial review.20 One involved a question of the retroactivity of a statute,21
another involved EPA’s interpretation of CERCLA’s civil liability standards,22 and in a third the
court conducted a limited review of EPA’s authority to act under the Leedom v. Kyne doctrine.23
These are all situations in which it is either settled that Chevron deference is not appropriate, or
at least strongly arguable that it is not. In one case resolved on Step Two grounds, the court did
not cite Chevron itself, but did cite a leading Supreme Court opinion elaborating on the content
of Step Two, an opinion in which the Supreme Court itself explicitly employed the Chevron
framework.24 Finally, two involved statutory intepretation in only a pickwickian sense, with the
court doing little more than reciting statutory language to dispose of a challenge.25 The remaining
three decisions are thus the only ones we found in which the Chevron methodology was clearly
called for and yet not explicitly invoked - and each of these employed reasoning entirely

19

Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn & Byse's Administrative Law: Cases and Comments
620 (9th ed. 1995) (quoting Judge Wald's advice in a 1994 speech to practitioners: "Now for you
agency case lawyers. Chevron is the password. In every case involving statutory interpretation,
think Chevron.").
20

Boise Cascade v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991); Clinton County Comm’rs v.
EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3rd Cir. 1997); Laguna Gatuna v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995);
Montrose Chem. v. EPA, 132 F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1998); North Shore Gas v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir. 1991); Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington, 66 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995); South
Holland Metal Finishing Co. v. Browner, 97 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996); PEACH v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996).
21

U.S. v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).

22

Matter of Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993).

23

West Virginia Coal Ass’n v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1991).

24

ALM Corp. v. EPA, 974 F.2d 380 (3rd Cir. 1992) (citing National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 505 U.S. 407 (1992)).
25

Hobbs v. U.S., 947 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1991); Pennsylvania Dep’t. of Envtl. Resources
v. EPA, 932 F.2d 269 (3rd Cir. 1991).
-8-

consistent with Chevron.26 So Chevron provided the explicit template of analysis in 98% of the
cases in our study in which it was clearly applicable.
A.

EPA’s Overall Performance as an Interpreter of Statutes

In recent years, EPA has suffered some notable setbacks in the courts of appeals. After
engaging in time-consuming and elaborate rulemaking, EPA has lost cases in court involving its
proposed national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter,27 its
decision not to adjust the NAAQS for sulfur dioxide,28 its call for adjustments in the state
implementation plans in 22 Northeastern states which would have required adoption of
California auto standards,29 its decision not to grant a waiver for the fuel additive MMT,30 its
decision to allow highway projects from previously approved regional transportation plans to
satisfy the Clean Air Act’s “conforming plans” requirement,31 its standards for the discharge of
sewage sludge under the Clean Water Act,32 and its decision permitting Indian tribes to
implement a waste management permit program under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA).33 In these and other agency setbacks, the courts of appeals have found that EPA
erred in its interpretation of statutory authority.
A recent study sharply criticizes EPA’s low success rate in defending its interpretations of
statutes in court.34 In an analysis of decisions involving EPA rules in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the years 1993-2000, this study found that of these 69 cases, EPA won only 33% of

26

James County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993); Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v.
EPA, 941 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1991); Systech Envtl. Corp. v. EPA, 55 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).
27

American Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), rehrg. granted in
part, denied in part, 194 F.3d 5 (D.C. Cir.1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000).
28

American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rehrg. en banc denied, –
F.3d. – (D.C. Cir. 1999).
29

Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir.), modified on rehrg., 116 F.3d 499 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
30

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

31

EDF v. EPA, 167 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

32

Leather Indus. of America v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

33

Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

34

Jonathan Adler, Environmental Performance at the Bench: The EPA’s Record in
Federal Court 11 (2000).
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them.35 In addition, it found that in the 44 cases in which a Chevron question was litigated, EPA
won just 41% of the time.36 These results led the study author to conclude that EPA acts “with
little regard for the limits or obligations of its statutory authority.”37
Our findings are more generous to EPA. Nonetheless, they still show EPA’s rules being
completely sustained in only 53% of the 111 rulemaking cases during our study period. Looking
just at the 83 rulemaking challenges in which a Chevron question was raised, EPA is also
sustained in 53% of the decisions in our data set (44/83). Whichever figures are chosen, it has
been suggested that they show that EPA regularly ignores the laws that Congress has written,
choosing instead to pursue its own “political goals and policy expediency.”38
Figures such as these cannot support that conclusion. Studies of EPA’s success in
litigated cases cannot generate any reliable inferences regarding EPA’s overall fidelity to
statutory authority because they suffer from selection bias.39 The litigated cases are not the entire
universe of instances in which EPA interprets environmental statutes, because many of the rules
that EPA writes and other actions that it takes include include statutory interpretations that are
never challenged. From the entire universe of challenged and unchallenged instances of statutory
interpretation, the challenged cases alone constitute a biased sample.
One reason some interpretations are not challenged is that no potential litigant believes
that EPA has erred in those interpretations. These are instances, then, of EPA’s apparently
staying faithful to its statutory authority, but they are excluded from any analysis that isolates on
the litigated actions alone. On the other hand, the decision to litigate an EPA interpretation
typically reflects a judgment that the interpretation is wrong. To be sure, this is not always the
case. If litigants are economically rational actors, they will make litigation decisions on the basis
of expected returns, so that a slight chance of achieving an extremely valuable victory could
justify the effort. Likewise, a calculation that the value of the compliance cost savings for the
period of time during which the challenged rule is suspended exceeds the costs of litigation could
also do so, even if ultimate victory is quite unlikely. Litigants might first decide to challenge a
rule on the basis of other mistakes they believe EPA to have made, and then add a statutory
interpretation challenge, which they would not otherwise have brought forward, because the

35

Id. at 8, Figure 1.

36

Id. at 9, Figure 2.

37

Id. at 11.

38

Id. at 16.

39

Selection bias involves “choosing observations in a manner that systematically distorts
the population from which they were drawn.” Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, & Sidney Verba,
Designing Social Inquiry 28 (1994).
-10-

marginal costs of the additional challenge are low. These complexities notwithstanding, it
remains the case that statutory interpretations that are actually challenged in litigation are more
likely to be wrong than are statutory interpretations that are never challenged in court. Therefore
the set of reported decisions involving Chevron challenges to EPA rules presents a biased sample
of all EPA statutory interpretations.
In an effort to reduce the problem of selection bias and to gain a better understanding of
EPA’s fidelity to statutory instructions, we studied all of the rules that could have been
challenged during our study period for which the agency prepared a regulatory impact analysis.
The vast majority of these RIAs were prepared because the rule was classified as major under the
applicable executive order. There were 75 such rules, of which 25 resulted in one or more court
challenges. In other words, 33% of all such rules were challenged. This is a much higher
percentage than the percentage of EPA’s total rules that were challenged.40 This set of rules with
RIA’s cannot not be considered representative of the entire population of EPA rules because it is
not a random sample. If anything, EPA’s success in defending statutory interpretations in these
high visibility rules should continue to overstate EPA’s error rate, but less so than does a sample
limited to the rules that have been challenged in court.
After identifying these 75 rules, we studied the explanatory preamble in the Federal
Register of each rule to determine the total number of statutory interpretations made by the
agency. Initially, this presented a specification problem that we needed to resolve. At one
extreme, one could take the position that each and every time EPA promulgates any operationally
distinct subpart of any rule, it has implicitly interpreted its statutory authority to authorize that
subpart. If such implicit interpretations were counted, the number of statutory interpretations
EPA has made in these 75 rules would be enormous. We concluded, however, that our attention
could appropriately be narrowed by excluding instances in which EPA’s authority was taken for
granted, because the important issue is the fidelity of the deliberate choices EPA made in
interpreting its law, and most implicit interpretations seem more compelled by a settled or noncontroversial construction of the relevant statute than the result of a deliberate choice. Therefore,
we tried to isolate those parts of rules in which EPA deliberated about a question of statutory
authority, whether because a question had been raised by a commenter or because someone
within the agency decisionmaking process had raised it. Operationally, we looked for passages
in the preambles in which EPA explicitly referenced and discussed the issue of statutory
authority. We have probably undercounted the number of distinct interpretations of statutes with
this methodology, because it would miss any interpretations that were not self-identified by the
agency.
We identified 132 different occasions of conscious statutory interpretation in the 75 rules.
In the court decisions reviewing the 25 rules of the 75 that were subject to court challenge, the
courts found eight Chevron errors. This is an error rate of 8 out of 132, or 6%. EPA’s
40

Of 3553 total rules issued in the 1990s, 111 of them, or 3%, resulted in decisions in
the courts of appeals.
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interpretations of its authority either were not challenged or else were sustained 94% of the time.
This is not equivalent to establishing that EPA was faithful to its statutory authority 94% of the
time, because some of the unchallenged interpretations may have been mistaken. Most of these
75 rules, however, were ones with appreciable economic impact, and it seems probable that the
vast majority of erroneous interpretations were flushed out through litigation, because the
amounts at stake in these rules provide the kinds of incentives to challenge them mentioned
earlier. In any event, this subset gives us a less biased estimate of EPA’s fidelity than does the
all-too-common focus on just litigated rules, and it shows a much smaller percentage of statutory
interpretation errors than do studies limited to litigated cases.
B.

Chevron Review of EPA’s Statutory Interpretations

While not being a good basis for inferences about EPA’s overall fidelity to statutes, the
litigated cases are worthy of study for what they reveal about the interaction between EPA and
the courts under the Chevron doctrine. In this section, in which we examine that interaction
more closely, we continue to employ an individual statutory interpretation challenge as our unit
of analysis, not an individual court decision. Simply totalling the cases in which EPA wins and
loses Chevron challenges fails to illuminate EPA’s overall performance as a statutory interpreter.
If EPA had made eight or nine contestable interpretations of statutes and been sustained on all
but one of them, an approach that totals case victories and defeats would misleadingly treat that
case as a defeat for EPA.
Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA41 illustrates the problem. The case involved at least
six challenges to EPA’s interpretation of provisions of the Clean Air Act giving it authority to
regulate emissions from nonroad engines and vehicles, and also, according to EPA, impliedly
preempting certain state regulations of those engines and vehicles. The court granted one of the
petitions for review, but only as to a single element of EPA’s rule, the scope of the implied
preemption of state regulation. The effect of this decision was to broaden the scope of preempted
state regulations, leaving in place the ability of states other than California to choose whether to
adopt California’s standards or the federal standards. It left the main structure of the federal
regulatory scheme intact. The environmental effects of this decision are unpredictable, but
probably negligible, as they depend upon whether states other than California would have
adopted standards tougher than California’s or the federal government’s, which seems unlikely.
The case ought to be counted as a substantial vindication of EPA’s rule, despite the single issue
reversal. Examining such cases issue by issue gives a much more respectable picture of EPA’s
performance.
In order to conduct our examination, we first identified the cases in which Chevron
challenges had been brought, and then separately analyzed each distinct challenge to an EPA
intepretation of a statute. Because EPA engages in statutory interpretation in adjudications as
well as rules, this analysis was not limited to judicial review of rules. In all we identified 102
41
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All Chevron Challenges

EPA Upheld

75.7%
153

EPA Rev'd

24.3%
49

Step 2 Decisions

Step 1 Decisions
40.9%
27

92.6%
126
7.4%
10

59.1%
39

Figure 1
cases in which one or more statutory interpretations of EPA were challenged, 83 of which were
rulemaking proceedings.42 In these, we identified 202 separate Chevron challenges, or an
average of 2 per decision. The aggregate results are in Figure 1.
As is well known, Step One of Chevron requires the court to decide independently
whether or not Congress “has spoken to the precise question at issue.”43 Whenever the court is
unable to conclude that Congress has precisely spoken, it is to defer to any “permissible” or
“reasonable” intepretation of the agency. From the day it was decided, one of the ongoing
interpretational disputes over Chevron itself is whether or not the Supreme Court, in announcing
this schematic approach to the judicial review of agency intepretations, intended to signal lower
courts to be more deferential to agency interpretations.44 Since Chevron, some of the court’s
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In all, we found Chevron cited in 109 separate decisions. Two of these were cases in
which EPA was interpreting its own regulations, and five others were decided on procedural
grounds without reaching the Chevron questions.
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467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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See, e.g, Shapiro & Levy, note 8 above, at 1069 (“The language in Chevron appeared
to order courts to go to step two if there was any ambiguity concerning Congress’ intent about the
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subsequent formulations of Step Two have attempted to add further gloss on the question of how
much deference is due. For instance, in the National R.R. decision, the Court wrote:
If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute,
deference is due. In ascertaining whether the agency's interpretation is a permissible
construction of the language, a court must look to the structure and language of the statute
as a whole. If the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some respects, a
degree of deference is granted to the agency, though a reviewing court need not accept an
interpretation which is unreasonable.45
However the Court has described the appropriate amount of deference, it has turned out that once
an agency succeeds in convincing the court that the statute is ambiguous, Step Two has given the
agency very considerable latitude. Indeed, Judge Stephen Williams of the D.C. Circuit once
stated that Step Two asks whether the agency’s interpretation could be presented with a straight
face to a Kennedy School seminar.46 The truly contentious issue in applying Chevron has not
been how much deference is due but rather when deference is due. The question, in other words,
is what determines the boundary line between a statute that is clear and has a meaning discernible
by the court without deference to the agency versus when it is ambiguous and results in the court
according the agency a degree of deference.

meaning of a statutory term. Since few statutes are absolutely clear, this approach appeared to
create a presumption of statutory ambiguity that would be difficult to rebut”); Schuck & Elliott,
note 8, above, at 1023 (“Most commentators agreed that in [Chevron and Chemical
Manufacturers] the Court strongly signaled its intention that reviewing courts defer more to
agency interpretations of their statutory authority.”); Ronald Levin, “The Anatomy of Chevron:
Step Two Reconsidered,” 72 Chi-Kent. L. Rev. 1253, 1256-60 (1997). Some of the early
commentary interpreting Chevron as a signal to lower courts to accord agencies more deference,
while disagreeing over the desirability of that signal, include Richard J. Pierce, “Chevron and Its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions,” 41 Vand. L. Rev.
301 (1988) (favorable to expanded deference); Peter L. Strauss, “One Hundred Fifty Cases Per
Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action,” 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987); Kenneth Starr, “Judicial Review in the
Post-Chevron Era,” 3 Yale J. Reg. 283, 284 (1986); Cynthia R. Farina, “Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,” 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452 (1989) (critical of
expanded deference).
45

National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1401-02
(1992) (citations omitted).
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Panel Discussion, “Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts
of Standing and Deference to the Agency,” 4 Admin. L.J. 113, 124 (1990) (comments of
Judge Stephen Williams).
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To the untutored, it might seem that very few questions of statutory interpretation will be
clear. Regardless of how detailed a statute Congress writes, implementation always raises issues
and controversies that have not been squarely anticipated by the statutory text, and it is these that
will give the agency and the parties the most difficulty.47 Chevron itself was an example, raising
the question of whether the Clean Air Act’s definition of “source” must be read only to mean
each discrete piece of industrial equipment emitting the requisite volume of air pollutants, or
whether it could also be read to include the facility taken as a whole. The distinction carried
implications for a number of significant regulatory judgments, such as deciding whether through
modifications a “source” had increased emissions sufficiently to require those modifications to
obtain regulatory approval. If the entire facility were a source, plant operators could add new
emitting equipment while closing down older equipment without triggering the approval
requirement, whereas if each discrete emission point were a source, it could not offset additions
with withdrawals in this way. Despite the significance of the issue and the detailed complexity
of the Air Act, the statute did not resolve the issue, and the Court deferred to EPA’s reasonable
decision to use the reading more generous to industry.
Not only should few questions of statutory interpretation be clear, but when they are
clear, one might expect that we will see very little litigation over them. A fundamental
assumption of the ossification debate is that EPA has strong incentives to avoid reversal of its
rules, an aversion which produces cautious behavior by the agency in constructing a defensible
record.48 If the statute is clear, EPA would know that it could be successfully challenged if it
adopted an interpretation that belies the clear text, and thus would have strong reasons to base
agency action on a different interpretation, just as it has incentives to invest in extensive
procedures above and beyond bare notice-and-comment requirements in order to avoid judicial
reversal or, when possible, to eschew rulemaking altogether.
Looking to the 1990s cases, our data on Chevron challenges to EPA in the nineties
confirm Judge Williams’ opinion that Step Two review is very generous to agency
interpretations. Even among the interpretations thought questionable enough to challenge in
court, once EPA got beyond Step One, it was upheld 92% of the time. There has not been much
movement in this result over time. In our sample of two years of cases from the eighties, EPA
was upheld 89% of the time in cases that reached Step Two.
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E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, “Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,” 101 Yale L.J.
969, 991 (1992) (“[I]f the inquiry at step one is formulated in terms of whether the statutory text
discloses that Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue, this results in even greater
deference to agency views, because Congress has undoubtedly ‘spoken to’ fewer issues in text
than it has through some combination of textual and nontextual sources.”)
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E.g., Daniel Farber, Eco-pragmatism 189 (1999) (“Because agencies are never sure
just how ‘hard’ the hard look will be, they strive to protect themselves against the most
unsympathetic judges.”).
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1.

The Puzzles of Step One

Our cases also show that success at Step One is quite a different matter. At Step One,
EPA loses 59% of the time. Clearly the courts are actively patrolling the boundary line between
the two steps, because they are finding 1/3 of the challenges to EPA interpretations to fall on the
Step One side of the line, most of them resulting in EPA losses. According to the courts, in the
litigated cases when the statute is clear, EPA gets it wrong more often than right.49
Turning from the agency’s incentives to those of potential challengers provides a partial
explanation for these data. As already noted, some potential challengers place value on delaying
the effective date of onerous regulations.50 In addition, petitioners may add statutory
interpretation challenges to cases brought on other grounds because the marginal costs of
bringing a statutory challenge are relatively small. Either impetus can produce statutory
challenges even though EPA has interpreted the statute soundly.
Were this a full description of EPA’s and petitioners’ behavior, we would expect to see
some litigated statutory interpretations, as we do -- 202 litigated interpretations in the nineties. In
addition, however, we would still expect very few Step One challenges that EPA would lose,
because the agency’s interpretation is something that it alone controls, and its incentive structure
suggests that it would try to avoid making costly mistakes. So the data still require further
explanation.
Before proceeding further, we can supply a larger context by comparing EPA’s
performance to other agencies’. Comparison of our results with those of another study indicate
that EPA’s success rate at Step One is hardly unusual among regulatory agencies. A study of all
cases in the courts of appeals in the years 1995-96 found that in Chevron cases resolved at Step
One, the agencies lost 58% of the time, a figure essentially identical to EPA’s.51 Overall, the
success under Chevron of all agencies during the same period was 73%, again nearly identical to
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In addition to analyzing overall performance in the 1990s, we analyzed three different
two year periods in the 1990s – 1991-92, 1994-95, 1997-98 – to see if there were any significant
variations with the decade. We did find some variations. EPA did less well in the middle period
(63% overall success rate) than in the other two (76% and 79%, respectively), but these results
are not statistically significant. Thus the shift from litigating Bush-era rules in the 1991-92
period to Clinton-era rules in the rest of the decade did not have a significant impact on EPA’s
success rate.
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Orin S. Kerr, “Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,” 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 31 (1998). As with us, Kerr used
a single Chevron interpretation or application, not a single judicial decision, as his unit of
analysis.
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EPA’s 75.7% success rate during the 1990s.52
EPA, then, does not appear to be out of step with its brother and sister agencies. This
raises the possibility that some of the conclusions we draw about EPA’s success and failures
under Chevron may be amenable to extrapolation to federal agencies more generally, although at
this point we make no claims in that regard.
Returning to EPA’s Step One losses, one possible explanation for them is that our earlier
assumptions about EPA’s incentives were incomplete. EPA may have incentives to proceed with
some interpretations of statutes even when it believes them to be erroneous. A particular
interpretation may be necessary to satisfy an important constituency, for example. Adopting a
rule utilizing a particular interpretation may enable the agency to take credit for a measure; later
on, the courts can take the blame for striking it down. Alternatively, EPA may have such strong
policy preferences for its course of action that it is willing to run the litigation risk of reversal.
(For this to be true, the expected gains from being able to pursue its chosen course – gains
discounted by the probability of litigation success – must be larger than the expected gains from
pursuing a policy less vulnerable to legal challenge.) Thus, although our aggregate statistics
show that EPA does not deviate outside its statutory authority very often, in various ways the
pursuit of “political goals and policy expediency”53 may still provide an explanation for some of
the Step One reversals that EPA does suffer.
Another distinct possibility for Step One reversals is that EPA and the courts
systematically and in good faith disagree over the boundary between the two steps. This
hypothesis has not been explored in the existing Chevron literature. That literature has noted that
the determination of a clear meaning under Step One is hardly a mechancial task. The task often
more closely resembles constructing a statutory meaning than it does finding one.54 The
combination of the many different tools of construction available at Step One and the fluidity of
how these tools are to be used together implies that different interpreters can reasonably reach
different results.55
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Id. Our data on Step Two are harder to compare with Kerr’s. He found that a
considerable number of cases citing Chevron ultimately collapsed Step One and Step Two into a
single “reasonableness” analysis, and he tabulated these separately from Step Two cases. Id. In
our review of decisions involving EPA, we found almost no such cases. We cannot explain the
divergence between Kerr’s results and ours. If, however, his “reasonableness” cases plus his
Step Two cases are treated as equivalent to our Step Two cases, then he finds the agency
prevailed 84.7% of the time, compared to our figure for EPA of 92.6%.
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Some work has been done seeking to discover whether sources of systematic
disagreement among interpreters can be found. For example, a number of commentators have
explored whether the political ideology or the substantive environmental policy preferences of
individual judges affect judicial votes in environmental cases.56 Little thought has been given to
the possibility that the differences between agency and courts as institutions might produce
systematic and good faith disagreements resulting in statutory interpretation. Before examining
the Step One cases, we develop the reasoning behind this possibility.
The boundary line question, as Justice Scalia has posed it, is the question of “how clear
is clear?”57 After posing it, he made a much quoted observation about the answer to it:
In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which a person
is (for want of a better word) a "strict constructionist"' of statutes, and the degree to which
that person favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope. The reason is obvious.
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text
and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering
requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will
require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally
adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning"' rule, and is willing to permit the
apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will more
frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of
"reasonable" interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which the courts must pay
deference.58
This passage joins two of Justice Scalia’s passions -- his belief that he will be capable of
deciding many of the Chevron cases brought before him at Step One and his rejection of
legislative history as a source of statutory meaning -- in a puzzling way.59 By rejecting legislative

56

E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., “Is Standing Law or Politics,” 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1741 (1999);
Emerson H. Tilller & Frank B. Cross, “A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice,” 99
Colum. L. Rev. 215 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, “Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning,” 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1377 (1999); Harry T. Edwards, “Collegiality and Decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit,” 84 Va.
L. Rev. 1335 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, “Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit,” 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997).
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Antonin Scalia, “Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,” 1989
Duke L.J. 511, 521 (1989).
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Id. at 521.
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See especially the discussion in Thomas W. Merrill, “Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine,” 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 366-73 (1994).
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history as generative of “agency-liberating ambiguity,” he in effect adopts Judge Leventhal’s
view of delving into legislative history, as the equivalent of going to a cocktail party and
scanning the crowd to pick out your friends.60 While Judge Leventhal more often picked out his
friends in the course of reaching an independent judicial judgment of the statute’s meaning,
Justice Scalia sees that if legislative history contains numerous statements of varying import from
which to choose, a judge under Chevron could just as easily use statements from the legislative
history selectively to find an ambiguity in statutory meaning which would lead to deference to
agency interpretations.61
Rejecting the use of legislative history to avoid that pitfall, though, creates problems of its
own in determining statutory meaning. Legislative history can resolve ambiguities as well as
create them, so that excluding resort to legislative history risks lessening one’s ability to find
meaning.62 Statutes can say just so many things, regardless of how detailed they are, and
interpretative disputes can in any event arise near the margins of what they do say. Chevron itself
is illustrative. If, contrary to fact, the legislative history of the Air Act had compellingly pointed
to a definition, a strict constructionist would not be able to resolve the matter at Step One,
whereas a judge using legislative history would. Thus, legislative history seems to have a
meaning-generating capability as well as an ambiguity-generating one. It therefore seems odd
that Justice Scalia could be so confident that a strict constructionist judge will be able to find
meaning more often without its use.63 In advance of knowing what particular statutory
interpretation problems one will face, and what the legislative history says, it is hard to see how a
person could confidently be “one who finds more often ... that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws.”64
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To a considerable degree, this puzzle dissolves if the activity of statutory interpretation is
an activity in which thinking a statute is clear (or ambiguous) helps make it so. We think a good
deal of light can be shed on Justice Scalia’s remarks concerning strict constructionism and on the
low success rate for the EPA at Step One, by adopting this hypothesis. The EPA has an
institutional interest in finding ambiguity, while Scalian judges have an incentive to discern
clarity, and these differences produce differences in the arguments that each finds persuasive
when confronting the task of statutory interpretation. The next section amplifies on this
hypothesis, beginning by examining statutory interpretation from the agency’s perspective.
2.

Institutional Incentives and Motivated Reasoning

When Congress creates an administrative agency such as EPA, it inevitably vests the
agency with a mandate that extends well beyond any strict and narrow implementation of the
regulatory components of the statutes it administers. The numerous statutes that contain those
regulatory components also give EPA the responsibility to conduct ongoing research and inquiry
into the vast array of environmental issues that the country faces.
These inquiries are very often conducted in service of some regulatory objective. EPA
analyzes studies of the impact of air pollution on human health and welfare, for example, in order
to establish the scientific basis for ambient air quality criteria and standards under §§ 108, 109 of
the Clean Air Act. Much of the knowledge EPA gathers regarding environmental problems does
not get immediately put to work in implementing regulatory obligations, however. EPA staff
monitor emerging environmental research well before it might be put to such task-oriented
purposes so that they will be somewhat up the learning curve when rulemaking begins. In
addition, EPA studies problems not immediately addressed by a regulatory statute so that it can
be in a position to recommend legislation to the President and the Congress, and also to assist in
United States participation in multi-lateral or international discussions of transnational
environmental problems prior to the existence of any domestic regulatory regime for addressing
the issues raised in such fora. For example, EPA has studied global warming for years.
These ongoing activities aimed at building general knowledge and expertise with respect
to issues within or bordering on EPA’s specific regulatory responsibilties are fundamental to one
of the basic purposes for which administrative agencies have been created. In order better to
promote the general public health and welfare, Congress and the President must have access to
reliable expert knowledge on a continual basis. Even after the progressive administrative ideal of
agencies’ administering social policy on an expert apolitical basis, has atrophied, acquiring and
maintaining the knowledge necessary to develop, implement and evaluate social policy still
counts as a fundamental justification for such agencies as EPA.
Another fundamental and obvious purpose of agencies such as EPA is to fill in the details
in statutory frameworks, to implement these statutes through the issuance of rules and

increases certainty might be tested.
-20-

instructions more specific than the statutes themselves, as well as through the enforcement of
those rules, to cope with unforeseen circumstances, and to resolve questions of detail that the
statutes have not addressed. These functions demand their own brands of knowledge, including
knowledge of how the targets of regulation operate and of the environments they face when
asked to carry out responsibilities that laws and regulations may impose on them. They also
inevitably entail knowledge of the art and science of administration, insofar as executing national
regulatory programs requires a bureaucratic structure.
To acquire the necessary intellectual resources, EPA hires professionals with the requisite
training and skills to analyze incoming information, to define research problems and to formulate
possible responses. These professionals, whether they be economists, lawyers, ecologists,
toxicologists, biologists, administrators or members of other professions, come to their work
prepared to employ specialized orientations to problem definition, methodologies for analysis
and norms for appropriate solutions.
As a consequence of these circumstances and the responsibilities they impose on the
agency, individuals and divisions within EPA develop perspectives on the nature of
environmental problems as well as the appropriateness of different solutions and implementation
structures that stand in a semi-autonomous relationship to the implementation of specific
statutory provisions. We will refer to the ideas, recommendations, conclusions and courses of
action that internal agency deliberation would generate independently of any Congressional
instructions as the autonomous views of the agency.
It is important to see that these autonomous views emerge as a legitimate consequence of
the institutional structure, statutory responsibilities and professional training of the agency and its
personnel. They are continually relied upon and legitimated by the very laws that Congress
enacts, because insofar as Congress vests any administrative discretion and any implementation
responsibility in the agency, it does so with the expectation of drawing upon those very expert
views. If the agency did not have an independent perspective on better or worse ways to define
problems, to approach problem-solving, and to implement programs, Congress would have a
highly unattractive agent in whom to repose that discretion and those responsibilities.
At the same time as these autonomous views are necessary, however, they set up a
situation of potential tension between the instructions that Congress does give to the agency with
respect to problem definition, problem-solving and implementation and those views. Points of
tension arise whenever the statutes that emerge from the political environment contain
stipulations or requirements that are inconsistent with the judgments that the agency would make
if it were operating independently of those statutory strictures. Sometimes these tensions can be
very large and long-lasting. For example, EPA for years resisted the Delaney Clause applicable
to food additives under the FDCA.65 Applying the clause to those substances would have had the
effect of prohibiting the use of many pesticides on processed foods, because small residues of
65
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pesticides often remained after processing. EPA believed that de minimis quantities of such
pesticides were acceptable from a public health perspective, that banning pesticides to comply
with Delaney would impose substantial costs on farmers and consumers, and that the application
of Delaney to processed foods was in any event irrational, in light of the absence of a Delaney
Clause applicable to raw agricultural products.66 For many years, EPA struggled to find ways
around the seemingly absolute instructions of Delaney, so that it could justify the de minimis
exception that it employed in setting tolerances under FIFRA. When EPA’s position was
ultimately challenged in court, EPA lost. The court found the mandatory language in Delaney to
be “clear and mandatory: ... Congress intended to ban all carcinogenic food additives.”67
The tension between EPA’s autonomous views and statutory command can also be
relatively obscure, apparent only to those mindful of the details of bureaucratic implementation.
At issue in EDF v. EPA,68 for instance, was EPA’s attempt to comply with provisions of the
Clean Air Act and the Urban Mass Transportation Act regulating any transportation project
requiring the approval of a metropolitan planning organization, a regional body set up under the
UMTA as a condition for receiving federal funding. Those provisions prohibit any MPO from
approving a specific project unless it comes from a “conforming” plan, meaning a transportation
plan that assists in the attainment or maintenance of ambient air quality standards.69 In their
entirety, EPA found the conformity provisions added by the 1990 Amendments, including this
one, to be “astonishingly confusing,” and capable of “frustrat[ing] the process of state and federal
cooperation and the integrated planning of transportation projects that [these provisions were]
created to foster.”70 EPA attempted to ameliorate some of the disruption by providing that for
transportation projects not receiving federal funds, the statute was satisfied if the project came
from a plan that had at one time been conforming, even if changes in the SIP requirements had
subsequently made the plan non-conforming.71 In EPA’s judgment, the “grandfathering” of nonfederally funded projects in this way (federally funded projects were not grandfathered at all)
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instilled a desirable flexibility, and hence made the integration of air policy and transportation
planning more administrable, than effectively placing a moratorium on all transportation projects
until new conforming plans had been written and approved.
Over a dissent by Judge Stephen Williams, a panel of the D.C. Circuit found that the
grandfather provision violated clear instructions of the Congress. The majority concluded that
authorizing grandfathered projects could result in authorizing projects that might not be assured
of not “caus[ing] or contribut[ing] to any new violation of any standard in the area,” as required
by 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1)(A). Because the out-of-conformity old plan had not been approved for
conformity to currently existing requirements, it might authorize projects inconsistent with new
modeling or new ambient requirements, and thereby end up contributing to new violations.72
These tensions will arise whenever the legislature creates an administrative bureaucracy
to implement complex regulatory regimes requiring the acquisition of expertise and the exercise
of discretionary judgment. The chances for such clashes have only increased in the modern era
of American administrative government, in which the President and the Executive Branch have
become recognized organs of national policy creation. In this environment, a President is
expected to have independent positions on issues of national significance. Especially when
environmental policy has been among the issues separating the presidential candidates, as it
regularly has since President Carter ran against Governor Reagan in 1980, the victorious
President feels entitled to seek to implement his positions, and the public expects him to do so.
Even when those positions are at odds with existing statutes, Presidents legitimately seek to
exercise what discretion the laws afford them in order to implement those positions, even while
they attempt to change those laws.
The Chevron decision provides the Supreme Court’s current understanding of the way to
resolve conflicts between the autonomous views of the agency and the statutory commands of the
Congress. Insofar as a statute clearly speaks to the precise question in dispute, the statute
prevails. If the statute does not speak clearly, the agency can legitimately and lawfully
implement its autonomous views through the exercise of its administrative discretion, so long as
its action is consistent with a reasonable construction of the statute. Chevron amounts to a
lexical ordering: first satisfy Congress’s clear instructions, then exercise reasonable discretion.
Although written as a template for judicial review, Chevron speaks in the first instance to
the agency itself, because it is the agency that must first determine whether there are clear
instructions to be followed or, on the other hand, room for discretion to be exercised.73 If the
agency finds itself in the first category, the tension between its views and the Congress’ is
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resolved by Congress’ prevailing. If instead it finds itself in the second category, the tension is
resolved by the agency’s views prevailing. Crucially, then, it is the agency who in the first
instance determines the boundary of its own discretion, not someone acting through processes
external to the very institution whose structure, responsibilities and professionalism produce the
tension in the first place.
Because the agency has views about the appropriate ways to proceed with respect to the
policy or administrative question at issue, the endogeneity of the Chevron determination means
that the boundary is initially located by an actor with incentives to reduce the territory controlled
by Congress and increase the territory that it controls. In Chevron terms, the agency has a
predisposition to find ambiguity. This predisposition does not operate exclusively of others,
however. The agency also has strong incentives to make decisions that are acceptable to
Congress, and for several reasons. For one thing, Congressional actions such as budgetary
decisions and oversight pressures can affect the agency’s ability to accomplish its objectives. If it
believes that Congress will monitor its statutory interpretations, this can provide a counterforce
to pursuing its own preferences. In addition, the judiciary creates incentives as well – the
incentives that contribute to the ossification effect – by signaling what it will take to survive
judicial review.
A final institutional element that functions as a counterweight to agency pursuit of its
autonomous views is the professionalism of its staff attorneys, who by training are supposed to
be committed to pursuit of the rule of law.
While we do not doubt the general tendency of agency lawyers to be respectful of
Congress’ instructions, these attorneys are still operating within the institution of the agency
itself, and so are themselves immersed in the distinctive norms of the institution.74 To the extent
that these norms are internalized by the lawyers, they produce a desire to see the agency’s views
effectuated. Even if such norms are not internalized, staff attorneys have self-interested
incentives to find ways to enable their superiors to give effect to agency preferences, rather than
to thwart them. So the shape of professional norms does not persist unaffected by the
institutional setting – indeed, the concern of an attorney to advance rather than retard her client’s
interests is itself a significant aspect in the norms of the legal profession. In short, agency
lawyers are relatively poor candidates to follow unerringly in the tradition of Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ self-description. Holmes once wrote to Harold Laski about a case involving a federal
statute. “I hope and believe,” he wrote, “that I am not influenced by my opinion that it is a
foolish law. I have little doubt that the country likes it and as I always say, as you know, that if
74
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my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."75 While this disposition
might be applicable to some Scalian judges, it is less so to most agency attorneys.
The existence of potentially countervailing preferences does not erase the agency
disposition to resolve the boundary question in its favor. Those countervailing preferences
simply provide a check on it which may or may not be sufficient to blunt its effect. The agency’s
autonomous views still motivate it to find statutory ambiguity.
In other contexts, cognitive psychologists have found some evidence that motivations
such as these can influence the very process of reasoning itself. They have developed a theory of
motivated reasoning to explain these results, which hypothesizes that when someone has “a wish,
desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task,” then this motivation
“may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for
accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.”76 In other words, in reasoning through a
problem, individuals will tend to be persuaded by arguments that take them to conclusions that
they prefer.
The model of the reasoning process lying behind the theory posits that when confronted
with a reasoning problem we access an existing supply of beliefs, inference rules, evaluation
techniques and arguments. A considerable body of work shows that “people access different
beliefs and rules on different occasions: They endorse different attitudes ... express different selfconcepts ... make different social judgments ... and use different statistical rules.”77 The theory of
motivated reasoning adds to this general result by positing that “directional goals” regarding the
outcome of the reasoning process are among the conditions that can influence the beliefs and
rules and the evaluations that people preferentially access, employ and find persuasive. For
instance, in one study women who were also heavy caffeine consumers were less convinced by
the evidence in an article claiming that caffeine posed risks for women than were women who
were low consumers of caffeine. Each group evaluated aspects of the article in different ways,
finding evidence or inferences stronger or weaker according to the result that accorded best with
their personal habits. Men showed no such differential effects.78 Similarly, persons who
endorsed the thesis that capital punishment deters crime were more likely to criticize a
disconfirming study on the basis of such reasons as “insufficient sample size, nonrandom sample
selection, or absence of control for important variables” than were those who already believed
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that capital punishment was not a deterrent.79 In short, “people are more likely to arrive at those
conclusions that they want to arrive at.”80
Motivated reasoning does not mean that anything goes so long as it leads to the desired
conclusion. “People are not at liberty to believe anything they like; they are constrained by their
prior beliefs about the acceptability of various procedures.”81 The motivation to employ
acceptable reasoning methods seems to be stimulated by the expectation that the results of the
reasoning process will be evaluated by others. Research has confirmed that subjects who
expected to be evaluated, or expected their judgments to be made public, reduced their tendency
to rely upon cognitive biases thought to lead to less defensible judgments, such as the use of
ethnic stereotypes, anchoring when making probability judgments, or excessively attributing
causality to individuals when their choices were constrained by their environment (the
fundamental attribution error).82
Unfortunately, we do not know of any empirical studies testing the theory of motivated
reasoning directly on lawyers or judges. We believe, however, that any lawyer who has litigated
a case has at some time had experiences consistent with the theory. Lawyers are trained to
advocate vigorously for their clients, including presenting the best legal arguments to advance
their client’s interest, when called upon to do so. Finding the best argument for a client does not
mean, however, that one has found the best argument for the outcome of the case. The best
argument of the other side might be better. This is not, however, how lawyers many times
experience the process of analyzing facts, researching arguments, testing theories and developing
their eventual legal position. More often than not, lawyers become convinced not only that they
have found the best arguments for their side, but that their arguments are superior to the other
side’s. Having the strong motivation to find persuasive arguments to support their client’s
position, they will find persuasive those argument types, evaluative techniques and other
elements in the reasoning process so as to lead to the vindication of their client’s position, just as
the theory of motivated reasoning suggests.83
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If the results of this research can be extrapolated to the context of statutory interpretation,
it leads us to expect an agency like EPA would find ambiguity more often than would someone
either disinterested or less interested in the outcome or by someone motivated to prefer
Congress’ views. Thus, the average judge would seem less likely than EPA to find ambiguity in
statutes. Adding the incentives of a Scalian judge would only enlarge this gap. By precommiting
himself to the position that texts quite often have clear meaning, a Scalian judge has further
incentives to find clarity where others might find ambiguity. Under the theory of motivated
reasoning, the differences in predispositions between the agency and the judiciary operate within
the process of reasoning itself by affecting the inferences, arguments and conclusions that each
finds persuasive. The theory of motivated reasoning thus provides one way to explain why a
strict constructionist judge who believes that statutes usually have clear meanings will in fact and
in good faith find them to have clear meanings more often than someone disposed to find
ambiguity will in fact and in good faith find clarity in them.
If this hypothesis is valid, we should find two features in examining statutory
interpretation by courts and EPA. First, we should be able to find pairs of professionally
acceptable argument-types that might appropriately be called upon at a particular point in a
statutory analysis, one of which would aid the conclusion that the statute is ambiguous, the other
of which would aid the conclusion that the statute is clear.84 Second, we ought to find EPA
availing itself more often of the former, and the judiciary more often employing the latter. A
significant number of EPA’s Step One losses meet these two requirements. Those that do not
illustrate further features of the process of statutory interpretation that are also consistent with the
hypothesis. We begin with the group of cases exhibiting the two features just noted.
3.

The Sounds of Silence

Whenever a statutory challenge raises a question as to which the statute does not speak
expressly, inferences from various sources of meaning will have to be employed to determine
whether the statute nevertheless speaks clearly. According to the theory of motivated reasoning,
agency lawyers will find inference rules that tend to produce ambiguity more persuasive than
Scalian judges do. Our set of Step One cases provides one clear confirmation of this effect: the
government’s reliance on, and the judiciary’s skepticism toward, the principle that failure of a
statute to prohibit EPA consideration of particular factors or considerations in developing
regulations gives the agency the discretion to consider them – in short, the principle that failure

motivated reasoning hypothesis is correct, the percentage of both winning and losing attorneys
responding affirmatively ought to be greater than 50%.
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to exclude equals ambiguity.85
In defending EPA rules, the government repeatedly relies upon a version of this argument
– and the courts regularly reject it. In American Forest and Paper Ass’n v. EPA,86 for example,
petititioners challenged an EPA decision to delegate discharge permit issuing authority under the
Clean Water Act to Louisiana, but only on the condition that the state continue to consult with
the federal Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service to ensure that
endangered species would not be threatened by discharges contemplated by the permit. The
CWA provides that EPA “shall” delegate permitting authority to a state program that meets nine
specified requirements.87 None of these stated requirements could be construed to encompass the
consultation requirement. EPA argued that it was authorized under the statute to add conditions
above and beyond the nine, because the statute did not expressly say that the stated requirements
were exclusive.88 The court rejected this interpretation, finding under Step One that the nine
stipulated requirements were exclusive.
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA89 involved a challenge to an EPA rule requiring
standards for reformulated gasoline under the Clean Air Act mandating that 30% of the oxygen
in reformulated gasoline be derived from renewable sources. The requirement had the effect of
guaranteeing a market for ethanol, at that time the leading source of renewable oxygenate. The
government relied upon EPA’s statutory authorization to issue “requirements for reformulated
gasoline.... Such regulations shall require the greatest reduction in emissions of ozone forming
volatitle organic compounds ... achievable through the reformulation of conventional gasoline,
taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emissions reductions, any nonair-quality and
other air-quality related health and environmental impacts and energy requirements.”90 EPA
asserted that the second sentence did not expressly limit the “requirements” that EPA could issue
to those that achieved emissions reductions, and that the term was broad and undefined in the
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statute. This gave EPA the discretion, it claimed, to issue reformulated gasoline regulations
designed to preserve the financial viability of renewables and to shift some portion of the
additives used to comply with the content requirements of reformulated gasoline to renewables,
which EPA viewed as environmentally advantageous.91 The court rejected this argument, finding
that the second sentence of the provisions authorizing EPA’s regulations stated their “sole
purpose.” Because EPA conceded that adding the renewables requirement was not expected to
achieve greater emissions reductions, and might even lessen them, its rule was vacated as
inconsistent with the statute, as the court interpreted it at Step One.
Friends of Crystal River v. EPA92 involved an objection the agency had lodged against a
dredge and fill permit application filed with Michigan’s Department of Natural Resources.
Acting under statutory authority and pursuant to regulations previously issued, EPA announced
that it was transferring the further processing of the permit to the Army Corps of Engineers.
Roughly one and one-half years later, EPA withdrew its objection and stated that it was
appropriate for State processing to proceed. Petitioners argued that EPA lacked the authority to
rescind the objection. EPA asserted that it did possess such authority, “because § 1344(j) [of the
Clean Water Act] does not specifically preclude the EPA’s withdrawal of its objections.”93 The
court agreed with the petitioners. The Clean Water Act provided a time limit within which the
state must comply with EPA’s objections, after which the Corps “may” issue the permit. Despite
the use of the permissive qualifier, the court held that EPA lacked authority to pull its objection
back after the state’s time limit had elapsed.
In Mead Corp. v. EPA,94 EPA had aggregated two non-contiguous sites under its
Aggregation Policy, giving them a single Hazard Ranking System number, and placing the
aggregated site on the National Priority List compiled under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), even though one site was more than a
mile from the other, and would not have qualified if treated separately. As part of its defense of
its Aggregation Policy, EPA noted that §105 of CERCLA, which governs placing sites on the
NPL, was silent on the issue of aggregation, meaning that EPA had discretion to aggregate in the
way it had. In an analysis that blended the two steps of Chevron, the court disagreed. It analyzed
CERCLA’s text as a whole, as well as the purposes of its various provisions to find no basis for
this kind of aggregation. Without squarely holding that EPA’s interpretation violated Step One,
the court also noted that even if EPA had discretion under § 105, permitting the aggregation of
low-risk and high-risk sites for listing purposes was unreasonable.
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The conflict between EPA and the courts over the sounds of silence is the most evident
pattern in the Step One reversals. In all we found a dozen cases in which EPA unsuccessfully
advanced some version of the silence is ambiguity argument, only to be met by the court’s
counterthrust that the statutory conditions were exclusive.95
In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,96 the D.C. Circuit supplied an extended analysis of the reasons for
this disagreement. The case was brought by Ethyl Corporation after EPA had denied its
application for a waiver from the Clean Air Act’s ban on new fuel additives.97 The Air Act
provides that EPA “may waive” that ban if it “determines that the applicant has established that
such ... additive ... will not cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control device or
system ... to achieve compliance [with the Act’s emissions standards].”98 After multiple
applications and litigation, EPA determined that Ethyl’s MMT, an anti-knock additive, satisfied
this condition. Nonetheless, EPA refused to issue the waiver, because it had concerns about the
public health impact of MMT in the environment. It claimed that because the waiver provisions
did not state that they were exclusive, the agency had discretion to consider “whether granting
the waiver was consistent with the objectives of the Clean Air Act.”99 Despite the presence of
the permissive verb, “may,” the court rejected EPA’s position, finding at Step One that Congress
had limited the factors that EPA may consider to those stated in the statute. Because Ethyl Corp.
had satisfied these, the waiver must issue.100
In the court’s judgment, “implicit in EPA’s argument was the notion that if Congress has
not mentioned public health in section [7545(f)(4)], then the statute was “silent or ambiguous” as
to that issue,” thereby triggering Step Two instead of Step One review.101 Failure to state a
condition or to declare expressly that the terms used were exclusive, however, was not going to
be enough to satisfy the court that Congress had “explicitly or implicitly delegated discretionary
authority” to the agency.
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To suggest, as the [agency] effectively does, that Chevron step two is implicated any time
a statute does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power ... is ...
flatly unfaithful to principles of administrative law.... Were courts to presume a
delegation of power absent an express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy
virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and quite likely
with the Constitution as well. We refuse, once again, to presume a delegation of power
merely because Congress has not expressly withheld such power.102
When Chevron was first decided, though, it was far from clear that EPA’s argument would
produce results “plainly out of keeping” with that decision, because the implications of the
decision were hardly apparent on the face of the decision itself – the Court itself had not precisely
spoken to the precedential import of Chevron.103 Ethyl Corp reads a “strict constructionist”
meaning into Chevron. In rejecting EPA’s argument, Ethyl Corp. reins in the hegemony of the
agencies by establishing the hegemony of the Scalian judge. Strict constructionist judges “do not
start from the premise that the [statutory] language is imprecise. Instead, [they] assume that in
drafting legislation, Congress said what it meant.”104 Judges with such a disposition are going to
find EPA’s argument unpersuasive. Statutes are much more precise if, as a general rule, they are
taken to exclude that which they do not expressly allow rather than, as EPA would have it,
allowing what they do not expressly exclude.
Silence can be heard many different places in federal statutes, though, and it would be
highly unlikely that courts could adhere unequivocally to such a strict interpretive rule. As often
as EPA fails to prevail in claiming an expansive interpretation of silence, it prevails in enough
other circumstances so that it has legitimate reasons to continue to believe in and to press its
approach notwithstanding the defeats it has suffered. For example, on several occasions the D.C.
Circuit has permitted EPA to exercise discretion to weigh costs against benefits or to consider
compliance costs in determining how to proceed under statutory language where such
considerations are at best an awkward fit. One of these, for example, involved a rule issued by
EPA to implement interstate pollution transport restrictions added to the Air Act by the 1990
Amendments. Under these requirements, state implementation plans must prohibit any source
from “contribut[ing] significantly” to nonattainment of the ambient air quality standards by any
other state.105 In the challenged rule, EPA had issued a SIP-call requiring 22 states and the
District of Columbia to require “highly cost-effective controls” on NOx emitters, defined as
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controls capable of removing NOx at a cost of $2000 or less per ton.106
Within the overall structure of the Air Act, using costs as a determinant of “significant”
for purposes of attaining the NAAQS in this way appears quite out of place. In constructing their
SIPs, states are required under the Air Act to assure compliance with the NAAQS by statutorily
established deadlines and, once in attainment, are to assure that the NAAQS will be maintained,
regardless of the cost.107 Under EPA’s interpretation of the cross-boundary responsibilities of
states, a downwind state could be forced to impose controls on intrastate NOx generators at
control costs considerably in excess of $2000 per ton while upwind sources continue to produce
emissions that materially hamper downwind state compliance and which could be abated less
expensively.
Nonetheless, the court granted EPA the discretion to take costs into account in
determining what amounts to a significant contribution to downwind air quality.108 In doing so,
the court relied in part upon a rule followed in several prior D.C. Circuit decisions that only
“clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost” will prevent an agency from doing
so.109
It is beyond the purposes of this current paper to debate the merits of the court’s clear
statement rule regarding costs.110 What is relevant is this: such a clear statement rule points in
just the opposite direction from the court’s rulings that reject EPA’s arguments that failure to
exclude amounts to permission. In its own sphere of application, the clear statement rule adopts
a position indistinguishable from EPA’s: failure to exclude the consideration of costs is to
permit them.
The clear statement cases are not flatly in conflict with the outcomes adverse to EPA
which we have reviewed in this section, none of which addressed an agency attempt to invoke
cost considerations not provided for by the clear text of the statute. Nonetheless, rulings like
these clear statement holdings do establish a jurisprudence of judicial review that can give
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agency lawyers some justification for continuing to invoke the ambiguity-generating norm
regarding silence, because they indicate that in some contexts the court will be more receptive to
the argument than in others. Whether the court will accept or reject the ambiguity-generating
norm thus turns out to be a matter of case-by-case decision making, rather than a blanket rule.
Because each statutory context can be distinguished from others, usually for a multitude of
reasons, there will be plenty of contextual material to mine in search of potentially distinguishing
characteristics that will take the next interpretive question out of the realm of the court’s
certainty-generating rule and into the realm in which it grants EPA the discretion to proceed. In
Ethyl Corp., for example, the court held that a statute saying that EPA “may waive” a prohibition
on new fuel additives for gasoline if EPA made certain determinations precluded EPA from
considering the public health and welfare in deciding whether or not to exercise that authority.111
The use of the permissive phraselogy provided EPA a reasonable ground on which to distinguish
that statutory context from others using mandatory phraselogy. It was not successful in that case,
but ex ante it was a reasonable position to take.
4.

Hard Cases

A number of decisions illustrate that the project of finding a statute’s plain meaning can
be a very complex task, whether or not one looks to legislative history as a legitimate interpretive
tool. Even the most widely accepted tools of construction can be deployed in complex ways.
One layer of complexity stems from arguments based on the “text and structure of the statute
taken as a whole” as an aid in that process, and many also avail themselves of other provisions of
the United State Code for assistance. In the case of other provisions of the statute itself, judges
employ the principle that “a court must ... interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme," and "fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole."112 While the
specific uses of the “text and structure” vary, they take on several general forms. Beginning with
the statutory provision or provisions that are the textual focus of the interpretive dispute, the
court tentatively inserts one of the candidate interpretations and then traces out the implications
of that interpretation for the operation of other parts of the statute, or sometimes for other
statutes. Alternatively, judges can invoke other statutory provisions that define a term similar or
identical to a term in controversy in other contexts. Both techniques were on display in the
recent Brown & Williamson113 decision holding that the FDA lacked statutory authority to
regulate tobacco. The Supreme Court analyzed the portions of the FDCA instructing FDA as to
what regulatory options it possessed once it asserted jurisdiction over a drug or a drug delivery
device. The majority concluded that the remedial parts of the FDCA would require banning
tobacco products, because they could not be shown to satisfy the statutory criterion of safety.
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This result, it further concluded, was contrary to Congressional pronouncements in other statutes,
which the Court read to preclude prohibiting the sale of tobacco products.
Use of text and structure and comparisons with other statutes can require tracing the
implications of a contested provision through multiple steps, especially in fields as statutorily
dense as environmental, health and safety legislation. Each step introduces the possibility of
disagreement over the interpretation of other statutory provisions. As significant as any other
factor capable of producing good faith disagreement, what counts as a “coherent” and
“harmonious” reading of the statute admits of no unique answer.
No better example of the possibility of conflicting harmonizations of a statute exists than
in the litigation recently viewed by millions of Americans as it was being presented to the Florida
Supreme Court. Florida election law has long provided that the Secretary of State “shall” certify
the votes received from each of Florida’s 67 counties seven days after an election.114 Returns
from counties not certifying votes to the Secretary by that time “shall” be ignored. The state’s
election statutes also provide a procedure to conduct a manual recount of votes originally
tabulated by machine,115 and in large counties this is not a task that can be finished in seven days,
especially if a candidate waits until near the end of her statutorily provided window after the
election for making such a request.116 A recent addition to the Florida election law provides that
returns from counties filed after the seven day deadlines “may” be ignored and the election
“may” be certified.117 Finally, Florida election law provides that “write-in, absentee and
manually counted results shall constitute the official return of the election.”118
Secretary of State Harris “harmonized” these statutory provisions by concluding that the
mandatory “shall” language imposed an obligation on her which the permissive “may” language
did not negate, meaning that she was required by law to ignore manual recounts filed after the 7th
day. In her view, manual recounts were harmoniously accommodated under the certification
process to the extent they could be completed within seven days. The statutory procedures
existing to contest an election after certification were adequate to accommodate justifiable
recounts after that. Alternatively, the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board “harmonized” these
statutory provisions by concluding that the more recently enacted permissive “may” language
took precedence over the mandatory “shall,” that the importance of counting every Floridian’s
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vote argued for the statutorily authorized manual recounts to count in the final certification and
that this reading was most consistent with the language including manually recounted votes in
the “official return” for the election. Without invoking outside-the-statute values, such as the
paramount importance of counting every Floridian’s vote, each of these harmonizations does a
sensible job in fitting together the pieces of Florida’s election laws.119
Uses of the tools of “text and structure” and additional statutes often seem to be most
persuasive when they are cumulative, as when one can show that the opposition’s suggested
interpretation creates anomalies or inconsistencies in several different parts of the statute or when
compared to usages in the provisions of other statutes. In other words, the more statutory
material that can affirmatively be harmonized, or the more statutory glitches or rough edges that
can be revealed, the more persuasive the argument for, or against, a particular reading. In the
American Trucking Ass’ns case, for instance, the government’s brief before the Supreme Court
traces the implications of their opponents’ proferred interpretation of § 110 of the Clean Air Act
through seven other distinct provisions of the Act to show that the interpretation proferred by the
industry petititioners creates tensions or inconsistencies with these other provisions and that the
government’s reading best harmonizes the statute.120
The other tools of statutory construction also produce strands of argument that contribute
cumulatively to the court’s ultimate conclusion. Appeals to statutory purposes and goals, to
punctuation, to dictionaries, and to the drafting history of enactments all can play roles,
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depending upon the statutory provision at issue and the larger statutory context in which that
provision is found. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any complete hierarchical ranking of
these tools. Rather, each type of argument seems to gain strength, and thus be harder to negate
with countervailing arguments, to the extent it is clear and decisive, measured against arguments
of its type. A dictionary based argument in which all consulted dictionaries agree is stronger
than one in which there is variance among them, for example. No case addresses how to
compare a strong dictionary argument to a competing purposes and goals argument, though.
Overall, then, statutory interpretation often seems to involve the building of a cable of
interwoven strands, rather than the construction of a continuous chain of deductive reasoning.121
This way of reasoning, familiar to pragmatists,122 can entail numerous junctures at which
presumptions, biases or other intellectual tools that assist in drawing inferences must be
employed. It also means that, at the end of the day, the overall strength of the cable must be
assessed, because disproving or rejecting any single strand does not itself invalidate the ultimate
conclusion reached. Each of these junctures presents occasions at which persons motivated to
find ambiguity and persons motivated to find settled meaning can diverge.
We found a group of decisions in which a dense statutory thicket necessitated complex
reasoning of this sort, and in which the courts ended up finding plain meaning where the agency
had found ambiguity. After a careful analysis of the competing arguments, it is hard for us to
fault EPA for asserting the interpretation that it did.
In Coalition for Clean Air,123 EPA tried unsuccessfully to avoid producing a federal
implementation plan for the Los Angeles air basin, as it had been ordered to do in a prior ruling
after years of agency foot dragging. Los Angeles has some of the most intractable air quality
problems in the United States, and EPA has been extremely reluctant over the years to exercise
effective federal authority to impose a federal implementation plan (FIP).
Its statutory argument for avoiding the effect of the earlier court order was based on the
1990 Amendments to the Air Act, passed shortly after the original order mandating a FIP. EPA
effectively argued that by virtue of the new SIP standards and requirements contained in the 1990
Amendments, the state of California had by statute been given the opportunity to produce a
compliant SIP before EPA had authority to impose a FIP. The structure of the Air Act has always
given primacy to state implementation, and giving California the first opportunity to meet the
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new 1990 standards was consistent with that structure.124 Either the FIP would have to be written
against the old, pre-1990 requirements, or it would have to be written against the new 1990
requirements. It would seem counterproductive to proceed under the first assumption, because
doing so would put in place a FIP that was outmoded and subject to supercedence even before it
was finished; and the second approach would deny California the first opportunity to address the
1990 requirements. The statutory triggering mechanism for FIPs contained in the 1990
Amendments, states that EPA “shall promulgate a [FIP] within 2 years after the Administrator ...
disapproves a State implementation plan,”125 language suggesting an event that could occur only
after the 1990 Amendments were enacted (as compared to, for example, “has disapproved”). The
1990 Amendments also make available some compliance flexibility not granted under the prior
law which would not be available to the EPA in drafting a FIP, and it seems inconsistent with the
statutory scheme to deny California access to that flexibility.126
Thus, EPA sought to build an interpretive cable with multiple strands of argument, based
on (1) the words used in a specific provision of the Act; (2) the text and structure of the entire
Act; (3) the effect of an interpretation of the triggering provision on other specific sections of the
Act; (4) the purposes of the Act. It was not strong enough to persuade the court. Interestingly,
the court found none of EPA’s arguments persuasive within its own argument-category, and
ended up drafting an opinion in which it used the same argument types as EPA, except that in its
cable of argument all the strands reinforced its conclusion.
We found this a recurring pattern in the cases involving complex reasoning, one that we
believe tends to give the written decisions of courts in these complex cases a greater sense of
inevitability – and hence cast a stronger shadow of illegitimacy on EPA’s intepretation – than
they deserve. Notwithstanding the widely varying statutory contexts in which they arise, and
regardless of how complex the set of arguments made, opinions resolving questions of statutory
interpretation exhibit a common general pattern: all of the individual argument strands almost
always line up in support of the court’s conclusion. Very seldom does the court acknowledge
that the relevant considerations are somewhat in conflict, but that the weight of the evidence
supports its interpretation. Given that statutes and pieces of statutes can be written at different
times, by different committees, this pattern of unanimity is counter-intuitive.
The style of reasoning in the cases we examined can also be captured by the pragmatist’s
“web of beliefs” metaphor. Pragmatists use this metaphor, which is related but not identical to
the cable-chain metaphor, to depict reasoning as a process in which we compare with one another
different values and propositions related to our reasoning project, going back and forth among
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them until we reach an overall judgment that has the strongest web of support.127 Within this
construct, through the effects of motivated reasoning, the separate argument strands tend
eventually to line up in the same direction. As we begin to reach a judgment, which may be
based on one or several particularly strong argument-types, we begin to privilege or find
persuasive arguments in the other categories that reinforce that judgment. In the end, for
example, arguments based on text and structure that support our conclusion become more
persuasive than arguments setting up a conflict with that conclusion; this reinforces the
persuasiveness of arguments based on purpose and goals that support our conclusion; and so
on.128
Coalition for Clean Air seems to be both a complex case and a close one, despite its
seriatim dismissal of each and every one of EPA’s arguments. Although the court never says so,
the conclusion of the majority may be influenced by the judges’ frustration in EPA’s continual
refusal to carry out direct orders of the court in a timely fashion, such that it would have required
something close to explicit language in the 1990 Amendments to convince them that EPA was
going to be able to slip out of those responsibilities via a legislative bail out. EPA, of course, had
equally strong policy preferences for reading the statute as it did. It had been trying to avoid
writing a FIP for the Los Angeles Basin for nearly two decades, due to the intractable nature of
the air quality problems in that region of the country.
5.

Easy Cases, Strong Policy Preferences

We found a small group of cases which seem most readily explained as instances in
which EPA had strong policy preferences that it chose to pursue even though the arguments that
its authorizing statute could be interpreted to allow that pursuit were extremely weak. Because
under the theory of motivated reasoning “people are not at liberty to believe anything they like
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[and] are constrained by their prior beliefs about the acceptability of various procedures,”129 these
cases do not square with the hypothesis that EPA lost the case because of a good faith
disagreement with the courts over statutory interpretation. Instead, it seems likely that EPA’s
lawyers knew they were advancing weak arguments.
In Backcountry Against Dumps,130 petitioners challenged a decision by EPA to approve a
solid waste management program authored by the Campo Band of Mission Indians under §
6945(c) of RCRA. The approval gave the Campos authority to regulate sanitary landfills within
its jurisdiction -- and specifically the landfill that it wanted to operate itself -- with more
flexibility than permitted had their program not received § 6945(c) approval. This section
authorized “states” to seek approval for such plans. The definitional sections of RCRA defined a
“state” as “any of the Several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands.”131 A separate section defined “municipality” to include “an Indian tribe of
authorized tribal organization.”132
The court agreed with petitioners that EPA lacked authority to grant program approval to
the Campos, because that section applied to states, and RCRA defined tribes to be municipalities,
not states. While it probably would have found the plain language of the statute enough to justify
its decision, the court also thought it significant that “when Congress wants to treat Indian tribes
as states, it does so in clear and precise language,” as in several other environmental statutes.133
The agency had plausible policy preferences for bringing Indian tribes within the category
of governmental entities eligible for the more flexible permitting authority, some fairly weak
ones specific to RCRA itself, and a strong one of more general applicability. Its RCRA-specific
objective was to avoid the “regulatory gap” that would exist if the government entity with
jurisdiction over the use of tribal land was unable to operate a permitting program for its sanitary
landfills that contained the full statutory authorities provided to states. When pushed at oral
argument, however, the agency admitted that any such gap was minor in light of the conceded
ability of the Campos to seek approval of a site-specific regulation for its landfill that would
contain all the flexibility granted under § 6945(c).134 In all likelihood, the reason pushing EPA
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to take the position that it had taken was left unstated: One hallmark of the Clinton
administration was to accord American Indians heightened respect. The very fact that Indians
tribes were treated as states under some environmental statutes but not RCRA was undoubtedly
galling to Indian organizations, as well as unappealing to the administration. It seems likely that
EPA decided to treat Indian tribes as having the same status as states under RCRA because of a
strong general policy toward that issue – even though the particular statute under which the
question was raised in this instance seemed quite clearly to prohibit doing so.
Easy cases do not have to be simple ones. Davis County Solid Waste Management v.
EPA135 involved complex statutory analysis. After EPA had issued proposed emission control
standards for municipal waste combustors (MWCs) pursuant to its § 111 Clean Air Act authority,
Congress enacted the 1990 Amendments to that Act. The Amendments added a new § 129
dealing specifically with the regulation of MWCs. EPA therefore was required to incorporate the
new § 129 provisions into its approach to MWC regulation.
Under its original approach, EPA had proposed to regulate MWCs on the basis, inter alia,
of the total per day processing capacity of all the MWCs at a single facility. One consequence of
this was that a relatively small single unit might be required to meet stringent standards along
with much larger units, because each was part of a large facility. Section 129 did not say in so
many words what were permissible categories of units for regulatory purposes, but § 129(a)(1)
did provide a timetable for issuing emission standards for different categories of MWCs. Two of
these categories were defined by the size of the MWC – those with capacities greater and those
lesser than 250 tons/year that were combusting municipal solid wastes (MSW). Two other
categories were defined by the type of waste being processed – those combusting hospital or
medical waste, and those combusting commercial or industrial waste. Section 129(a)(2) also
authorized EPA to “distinguish among classes, types ... and sizes of units within a category in
establishing such standards.” After EPA proceeded with a regulatory approach that continued to
divide MWCs into categories according to the capacity of the entire facility, it was challenged by
petitioners claiming that § 129 required that all MWCs that combusted MSW and had less than
250 tons/year capacity be put in the same category. As discussed below, the issue was
consequential for petitioners. The issue was consequential because the stringency of the
standards applicable to existing MWCs depended upon the category in which they were
classified.
EPA believed that Congress did not intend radically to revise the approach the agency had
taken to MWC regulation in its already commenced rulemaking, as would be the result if the
petitioners’ challenge were correct. On its face, the statute reflected Congress’ awareness of the
already in progress rulemaking proceeding, for it contained an express provision stating that
nothing in § 129 altered schedules for issuing standards established pursuant to settlement or
consent decrees, as EPA’s schedules had been. At the same time as Congress was aware of the
ongoing proceedings, nothing in the text of the statute nor in the legislative history expressed
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disapproval of the basic structure of the approach EPA was taking; the sole informative
references to EPA’s ongoing rulemaking in the legislative history suggested that the statutory
approach was “building upon” EPA’s, and that the statutory language was intended to tighten
emissions controls compared to EPA’s proposals. As an agency that had deliberated prior to
issuing its notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the best way to proceed, EPA had every
reason to want to continue with that basic approach unless persuaded otherwise by adverse
comments received during the notice-and-comment period, or unless instructed otherwise by the
Congress. EPA concluded that it had not been instructed otherwise.
EPA’s problem was that the statutory scheme enacted by Congress proved very difficult
to square with the agency’s original approach. Section 129(a)(1)(A)-(D) identifies the four
groups of incinerators named earlier; (E) gives EPA authority to designate “other categories,”
indicating quite plainly that Congress considered MWC’s of less than 250 ton/year, MWC’s of
greater than 250 tons/year capacity, medical waste incinerators, and commerical incinerators each
to be a “category” of MWC. Section 129(a)(2) then establishes a methodology for determining
the minimum control level for existing units in each category that is dependent upon the
membership of each category, by being set in the statute equal to “the average emissions
limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of units in the category.”136 The effect of
following Congress’ apparent scheme is to group all existing MWC’s of less than 250 tons/year
capacity together, while the effect of following EPA’s original rule groups these smaller MWCs
together with larger ones, if each is found within a facility that has a capacity greater than 2,200
tons/year.
The court’s analysis of the text and structure of the Act invoked ten different sections or
subsections of the Act, through which it constructed a compelling case in support of petitioners’
challenge. Ultimately, EPA was left to arguing that Congress in effect misspoke, or miswrote,
and that its references to unit capacities of various types in § 129 actually were references to total
facility capacities of various types.137 Were legislative history given heavy weight by the court,
EPA arguments might have moved the court, because along with the legislative history discussed
above, EPA did adduce some additional legislative historical evidence suggesting a drafting
mistake. However, whatever weight such considerations might have were negated in the court’s
view by what may have proved to be the most damaging statutory subsection of all: § 129(g)(1)
explicitly defines an MWC “unit” to be “a distinct operating unit of any facility.” That definition
is impossible to square with EPA’s contention that when Congress wrote “unit” elsewhere in the
statute that it really meant “facility.” The court was unwilling to contradict the statute’s own
definitional section.
In Davis County Solid Waste Management EPA ended up having very little going for it in
terms of arguments based on the text and structure of the 1990 Amendments. Its only arguments
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emanated from legislative history. Whatever else may be in dispute about the manner in which
courts analyze statutes to determine their meaning, this much stands out: when the textual and
structural strands of argument support a particular meaning, arguments based on legislative
history are not going to change that result. Davis County Solid Waste Management thus stands as
a counter-Holy Trinity for the post Chevron era.138 Whereas the Court in Holy Trinity was
willing to work around plain statutory language in order to achieve a result suggested by the
legislative history, the Davis County court declined to do so.139
6.

Conclusions Regarding Step One Reversals

Many of the Step One cases in our data set are consistent with the hypothesis that EPA
personnel and the judiciary have systematic and good faith disagreements about the question of
when deference is due – the how clear is clear question. The only group that cannot easily be
reconciled with this hypothesis is the group of easy case but strong policy preferences.140
Admittedly, it is contestable whether the cases we find easy should be classified that way, but if
that classification be granted, then these cases represent situations in which EPA’s defense of its
interpretation was beyond the bounds of plausibility. Because motivated reasoning posits that
individuals are checked by norms of acceptability in constructing arguments, motivated
reasoning cannot explain these outcomes.
A much more common approach in the growing literature on the relationship between
agencies and the courts explains disagreements between the two as some combination of
conscious decisionmaking that trades off policy preferences and rule of law or other values.
Both sets of individuals are modeled as people who maximize utility, making trade-offs when
preferences conflict. Judges may choose between “craft” and “policy,” for instance, and agency
personnel may choose between maximizing budgets (by keeping relations good with Congress)
and policy.141 Whatever the trade offs involved, individuals are seen as making conscious

138

Holy Trinity Church v. United States,143 U.S. 457 (1892). The case raised the
question of whether an act making it unlawful to assist the immigration of aliens under contract
to perform “labor or services of any kind” applied to the Church, which had contracted with an
English cleric to become its rector. Concluding that the legislative history indicated the statute
was not meant to apply to “brain toilers,” the Court held in favor of the church.
139

For a recent argument that the Court in Holy Trinity actually failed to give effect to
Congress’ intentions as expressed in the best reading of the legislative history, see Adrian
Vermeule, “Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church,” 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1833 (1998).
140

See TAN 128-38, above.

141

See Shapiro & Levy, note 8, above, for a model of judges as trading off craft and
policy. Jonathan Adler treats EPA as if it consciously ignores what it knows to be the law in
-42-

choices between obeying the law or pursuing policy goals, so that the legal arguments they assert
are regularly taken to be strategic, not the product of conviction.142
Except for this last group of decisions, however, the good faith disagreement hypothesis
we have sketched here leads to similar predictions about behavior as the strategic approach does.
The mechanisms through which policy influences choice under our approach, however, are
internal to the legal reasoning process itself. Arguments and analyses are experienced as more
persuasive because they produce decisions that individuals otherwise are motivated to reach.
Under this approach, when individuals make choices that favor their policy preferences, they may
not be trading off compliance with the rule of law versus those preferences. Their processes of
legal reasoning may have inclined them to conclude that the rule of law is consistent with those
policy preferences.
There is no reason why the internal process and the strategic process cannot each
contribute to human decision making. Indeed, we think that some combination of these two
mechanisms might well provide a better description of many legal decision making processes
than either one in isolation.
7.

Step Two and the Reluctance of the Courts to Resolve Questions of Degree

The Step Two cases raise some distinct issues. So far, we have argued that agencies and
judges may have systematically different motivations toward finding certainty in statutory
interpretation, and that this motivation helps explain why judges find statutes to have clear
meanings more often than the agency does. This only partially helps us understand the 67% of
Chevron decisions in which the court agrees with the agency that the statute is ambiguous, nor
why EPA is so overwhelmingly successful at this stage of Chevron analysis (over 92% success
rate in the nineties).

preference for policy goals and political expediency. See Adler, note 34, above. The examples
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The number of times courts agree with the agency that a statute is ambiguous suggests
that norms of the interpretive judicial craft do indeed impose some constraints on the courts, as
Shapiro and Levy, along with others, have postulated.143 Within those constraints, not every
statute can be read to have a plain meaning. It is a separate question, though, why EPA is so
overwhelmingly successful at Step Two.
One possible explanation for the agency’s high success rate emerges from a deeper
inquiry into what count as acceptable craft norms. Step Two evaluations, by definition, are made
once the court has verified that the statute is susceptible to being given more than one meaning.
The reasons that an agency has for choosing between the legitimate meanings emanate from the
same set of autonomous views that motivated it to find ambiguity in the first place. Those
autonomous views reflect agency resolution of conflicting choices based on its own all-thingsconsidered policy considerations, mixed undoubtedly with considerations of political expediency
as well. At Step Two, however, the agency’s pursuit of “policy goals and political expediency”
ceases to be anathema, as it was at Step One. Now this is precisely what our system of
government expects and anticipates the agency will and should do. "The power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress."144
The rationale of Chevron itself depends heavily on the idea that agencies have been
appropriately tasked by Congress to reconcile conflicting policy goals and interests. Not only
have the agencies been given this responsibility, the courts have emphatically not been given that
responsibility. In the key theoretical passage in Chevron, the Court wrote:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not
on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices--resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.145
This is the language upon which were based many of the predictions that Chevron meant great
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deference. The agency’s choice among the different options that an ambiguous statute makes
available will typically involve a decision that one meaning advances a mix of competing policy
interests, to a better degree than another – the very kind of choice that courts are ill-equipped to
make.146 If appellate courts are faithful to this aspect of Chevron, they will adopt a very
deferential attitude toward the agency’s choice at Step Two.
In contemporary times, the judiciary’s aversion to conducting policy analysis that has
initially been assigned to federal agencies constitutes a continuing reaction to Lochner.147 Courts
do not wish to be charged with imposing their own policy views on the elected branches of
government. At a minimum, some argument anchoring such action in the text of the Constitution
is required before the courts will take that step, and there is no such anchor available to judges
assessing the validity of agency decisions that by the Court’s own characterization only involve
the weighing of competing policy interests under constitutionally valid delegations by Congress.
After Lochner, no ordinary constitutional anchor will suffice, either. Lochner, after all, was itself
crafted as a decision based on the Constitution. The only conceivable constitutional anchor for
second-guessing an agency balance appears to be the Due Process Clause’s protection against
irrational government action, but this has been given such an undemanding interpretation that it
could not easily support intrusive review.
Lochner-phobia fairly compels courts to give agencies a wide berth at Step Two. In
contrast to Step Two, Step One finds courts on much firmer ground. Agencies have no
comparative or democratic advantage in determining what Congress said. Here, courts may even
have pride of place, because by superintending the action of agencies they ensure that the laws
that Congress writes will not be lost in the halls of the bureaucracies. So their democratic
pedigree is much more solid at Step One. So, too, is the style of reasoning to be employed. If
Step Two were to be a serious check on agency decisions, courts would have to weigh competing
policies themselves. The third noticeable dimension of the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia that
has an effect on the judiciary has been his antipathy toward judicial analyses that requires
weighing or balancing of values.148 Vigorous Step Two review would run square up against the
argument that weighing or balancing of competing policy interests is highly inappropriate
judicial activity.
In its place, Justice Scalia advocates what Thomas Grey has aptly named a “new
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formalism.”149 In fact, in Professor Grey’s typology, textualism is subsumed as a part of formalist
thinking.150 One value that the new formalism denies should play any role in legal reasoning is
the kind of consequentialist policies that agencies routinely consider, which Grey terms
“acceptability.”151 Acceptability comes into play only as a tie-breaker in rare cases, or in extreme
cases where formal reasoning leads to outrageously unacceptable results, or in a justification of
the formalist system as a whole. The new formalism is not a stiff-legged mechanical
jurisprudence. To the contrary, Grey argues that it turns out to be “moderate and pragmatic”
formalism.152 This suggests that the new formalism can comfortably subscribe to the cable vs.
chain understanding of the reasoning process, so long as the ultimate object of that thought
process is to ascertain determinate meaning, and so long as one of the strands in the cable does
not involve a weighing of policy values. The new formalism, in a word, is very much at home
with Step One as we have described it, and very much averse to infusing Step Two with much
content.
Our inquiry into the judicial treatment of EPA’s use of science when challenged in
litigation reflects, we believe, another manifestation of the judicial tendency toward formalism
and categorical distinctions and aversion to answering questions of more or less. There the
contrast shows up in a striking reluctance to second-guess EPA when the challenge requires an
evaluation of degree, such as whether EPA’s selection of data upon which to rely was better or
worse than another possible data set, compared to a greater willingness to overrule EPA when the
nature of the challenge is categorical, such as whether a conclusion drawn by EPA was without
any factual support, or whether EPA had completely failed to explain a link in its chain of
reasoning.153 We examine the science cases in detail in the next Part.
Finally, we report on our statistical findings concerning the tools that the courts in the
1990s employed to assist them in statutory interpretation. Our results show that the tools
associated with textualist interpretive approaches predominated.
Figure 2 presents the percentages of statutory interpretation decisions in which the court
made reference to various common tools of intepretation. The most clearly text-based arguments
are heavily dominant, with arguments centering on the meaning of discrete provisions being

149

Thomas C. Grey, “The New Formalism” Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 4, 9/6/1999.
150

Id. at 2.

151

Id. at 26.

152

“[A]t its theoretical core, the new formalism is just the old legal pragmatism.” Id. at

153

See TAN 188 to 193, below.

29.

-46-

made in 88% of the cases, and harmonization arguments being made in 68% of them.154
There is also good evidence that non-text based arguments are not heavily relied upon in
cases involving EPA. The rejection of legislative history has been part and parcel of the
textualist movement in statutory interpretation, and we find strong evidence that legislative
history is not playing a significant role in determining the outcomes of EPA cases. In our data
collection, we first coded “legislative history cited” any time legislative history was identified in
the opinion of the court in connection with an argument regarding the meaning of the statute.
This excludes references to legislative material to establish some procedural fact about the
legislation at issue. This coding protocol is consistent with some previous studies of legislative

Figure 2
history used in the Supreme Court.155 We found legislative history cited in this fashion in 33%
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of our Chevron cases. This figure is midway between the 18% rate Professor Merrill found in the
statutory interpretation cases of the Supreme Court during the 1992 Term and the 49% rate
Professor Schacter found in such cases decided during the 1996 Term.
We think this 33% figure may overstate the role that legislative history is playing in the
courts of appeals. Admittedly, in our data set opinions are often written so that it is difficult to
tell the precise role that legislative history plays in the court’s overall opinion. One consequence
of the “web of belief” or “strands of the cable” style of argument referred to earlier,156 is that the
opinion does not indicate on way or the other whether the result would have been different if
legislative history had been strongly contrary to the meaning suggested by text-based tools alone.
A judge could respond to a legislative history argument because it had been vigorously argued by
a party, not because the judge viewed the argument as dispositive. On the other hand, a judge for
whom legislative history was material to her conclusion could write an opinion without relying
upon it in order to bring along a colleague who was skeptical about its use.
Legislative history also functions differently at Step One than it does at Step Two. At
Step Two, even judges who eschew legislative history at Step One may refer to legislative history
for information about what policies and objectives seem relevant to the interpretation of the
statute, so that they can pass judgment on whether or not the agency interpretation constitutes a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policy interests. Because policies do not have to have
the status of law, such sources are more legitimate for such information than they are to a
textualist trying to answer the Step One question.
Notwithstanding the interpretive difficulties, we did code legislative history arguments
separately when the language of the opinion itself suggested that such history was doing more
than providing optional affirmation of a decision reached on other grounds. In coding for the
“legislative history relied upon” variable, we excluded cases in which the decision takes the
legislative history to be itself ambiguous or otherwise unhelpful, we excluded cases in which a
party’s arguments based on legislative history are rejected,157 and we excluded cases in which the
structure of the opinion strongly suggests that a conclusion would have been reached even if the
legislative history cited did not exist. Those limitations reduce to 8% the percentage of cases in
which legislative history was relied upon, in the sense just defined, rather than simply cited.158
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If the court rejected one party’s legislative history arguments but elsewhere used
legislative history arguments affirmatively, we counted the case.
158

The use of legislative history in the 1990s cases involving review of EPA scientific
determinations was even rarer, even though part of the task of a court engaging in review under
the arbitrary and capricious test is determining “whether the [agency] acted within the scope of
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IV.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EPA SCIENTIFIC DETERMINATIONS
A.

EPA’s Overall Performance in Making Scientific Judgments

The manner in which the courts review statutory interpretations of agencies such as EPA
has attracted considerable attention in the academic literature, particularly since the Supreme
Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron. It is not only EPA’s interpretations of its enabling statutes
that have been the frequent focus of judicial review, however. Litigants also routinely challenge
the manner in which EPA implements these statutes, i.e., the manner in which EPA applies those
statutes to the facts before it in a given situation. This aspect of the relationship between EPA
and the courts has attracted relatively less academic attention, despite its obvious importance to
the fate of the agency’s efforts to fulfill its statutory mandates. In this Part we examine the
relationship between the courts and EPA with respect to this aspect of EPA’s activities, with
special emphasis on challenges that have been brought against EPA’s use of science.
During the 1990s, litigants with pro-industrial or pro-development agendas were
responsible for initiating 79% of the challenges to the validity of EPA’s scientific determinations,
which was up from 70% in the 1980s. During the period 1986-87, EPA lost 15% of challenges
brought against its scientific determinations. During the 1990s, that figure rose to 22%. Proenvironmental litigants succeeded on 32% of their challenges to EPA’s science in the 1990s,
compared to 40% in 1986-87. The figures for pro-industry litigants moved in the opposite
direction. During the period 1986-87, pro-industry litigants prevailed in only four percent of
their challenges to EPA’s scientific determinations. In the next decade, they prevailed 19% of
the time. The nearly five-fold increase in the pro-industry success rate is statistically significant
at the 90% level.159
These figures raise some intriguing questions. First, why were more than three out of
every four challenges during the 1990s industry-based? One possibility, of course, is that EPA
sides more frequently with pro-environment interests. If pro-environmental interests are satisfied

its authority,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), and
whether the agency’s decision was based on consideration of factors made relevant by the statute.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Of the
scientific review cases we discuss in the next part, the courts relied on legislative history as part
of their substantive analysis in only three cases (BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784
(6th Cir. 1996); NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992); Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473
(D.C. Cir. 1991)), and in one of those cases (BP Exploration, 66 F.3d at 796), the court used the
legislative history only to confirm its interpretation of the statutory text.
159

P-value = 0.0673, using Fisher's Exact test. This is the only change between the
EPA’s 80s track record and the 90s identified in this paragraph that is statistically significant at
the 90% level.
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more frequently with the outcome of EPA’s scientific determinations than are affected industries,
they will have less impetus to challenge those decisions than will disgruntled industrial concerns.

A tilt by EPA toward environmentally protective scientific determinations is not the only
possible explanation, however, for the predominance of industry-based challenges to EPA
science. Environmental groups may be more selective in raising challenges in court to EPA’s
scientific determinations, even if the agency reaches results unacceptable to those groups just as
often as it reaches results unacceptable to industry. Science challenges are expensive to pursue.
A challenger typically must hire experts to assess the validity of the process by which EPA
reached the disputed conclusions, and in some instances may want those experts to perform their
own assessments to compare the results with EPA’s. If environmental groups lack the financial
resources available to regulated industries, they may simply be unable to initiate as many sciencebased challenges as does industry. In a related vein, environmental groups may prefer to allocate
the bulk of their resources to law-based as opposed to fact-based challenges because of a
perception that law-based challenges are likely to have a wider impact than will a challenge to
resolution of a particular scientific issue.160 If so, environmental groups may prefer to confine
their scientific challenges to high impact proceedings such as broad-based rulemaking
proceedings in which EPA’s resolution of scientific issues yielded regulations deemed by these
groups to be insufficiently protective.
Another possible related explanation is that industrial interests may pursue challenges
that have lower prospects for success than environmental interests do. If a judicial challenge
results in a stay of a new regulation pending court disposition, industry can benefit from that
delay, whether or not it ultimately prevails on the merits.161 Environmental groups are less likely
to face situations in which they benefit from delay. They could so benefit if the agency adopts a
less stringent regulation in place of a more stringent one, and they are able to convince a court to
stay the new rule pending the outcome of the challenge. They will not benefit, however, from the
stay of a regulation that affects an industry or a problem for the first time or that tightens a
regulation already in place. Thus, in deciding whether to challenge the regulation based on the
validity of the science upon which it is based, environmental groups face different strategic
options and as a result may have a higher threshold for anticipated success on the merits than do
potential industrial challengers.
A second interesting question relates to EPA’s overall success rate in these challenges.
While we cannot rule out the possibility that the increase from 15% losses to 22% losses was due
to chance, there are several reasons to think that this increase might be due to systemic features
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By comparison, industry and environmental Chevron challenges are more evenly
balanced. Industry brought 59% of the Chevron challenges in the 1990s; environmental
organizations and individuals representing environmental positions brought 41%.
161

See TAN __ to __, above.
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of the EPA-court interaction. One is that the courts might have been somewhat more aggressive
and less deferential in their review of EPA’s scientific determinations in the 1990s.
Commentators have noted a possible tension between the D.C. Circuit, on which conservative
judges predominate, and the Clinton administration, which might manifest itself in this way.
Another possibility is that the tenor of judicial review remained constant but that EPA was
willing to regulate on the basis of evidence that it would not have been willing to rely upon at an
earlier time. Some have suggested that EPA has relied less on science – and used less credible
science – in the Clinton Administration.162 Even if the threshold of judicial acceptability
remained the same, EPA may not have been able to convince the courts to approve of its actions
on the basis of evidence that appeared relatively weak.
Alternatively, it may be that the problems EPA tackled in the 1990s were more difficult
and intransigent than the ones that the courts reviewed in the earlier period. If the problems were
less susceptible to easy resolution, it is perhaps not surprising that EPA reached the “wrong”
result, from the courts’ perspective, or at least was not able to convince the courts that it reached
a defensible result, in a greater percentage of cases than during the earlier period. This
explanation is consistent with the conventional wisdom that EPA was able to “cherry pick” the
easiest problems during the early years of its existence and that the solutions to problems
subsequently became less obvious. It is also consistent with the perception that some of the
problems EPA has tackled in the last decade are more controversial than were earlier subjects of
the agency’s attention. There could be little dispute that the Cuyahoga River, when it caught fire,
was polluted and in need of cleanup. It was not as obvious during the late 1980s and early 1990s
that acid rain was a phenomenon in need of a regulatory fix or that global warming was
attributable to pollution from human sources.
Finally, why has the success rate for industrial challenges but not environmental group
challengers risen during the last decade? One possibility is that any tilt EPA has experienced in
favor of more pro-environment scientific decisions has resulted in an increased percentage of the
decisions that are harder for EPA to defend. Another explanation may be that the courts have not
only become more aggressive in their willingness to review EPA’s scientific determinations, but
that they have also become more skeptical of the value of pro-environment decisions and are
therefore more inclined to reverse them (and less likely to reverse EPA’s pro-industry
determinations) than they were during the 1980s. This thesis presents the possibility that the
judges have become more pro-industry at precisely the time that EPA has inclined more heavily
toward pro-environmental scientific determinations. Such a combination, not surprisingly,
would yield a higher percentage of reversals in scientific challenges filed by industry and a lower
percentage of reversals in challenges advanced by environmental groups.
It is difficult to assess some of the factors that are relevant to answering these questions.
Direct evidence that EPA has slanted its scientific determinations increasingly toward a pro162

Remarks made by several commentators at the “EPA at 30" conference, Duke
University School of Law, December 7-8, 2000.
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environment agenda would be difficult to come by, for example. Likewise, the judges on the
Courts of Appeals are not likely to admit to being more skeptical of, no less antagonistic towards,
environmental protection endeavors than judges in days of yore may have been. It is possible,
however, to scrutinize closely the cases in which litigants have challenged EPA’s scientific
determinations to ascertain whether the cases present any patterns, such that one can identify the
kinds of issues on which EPA was likely to lose during the 1990s and those on which it was
likely to win. Those patterns, in turn, may shed some light on the approach that the courts have
taken in recent years to the judicial review of the manner in which EPA implements its statutory
mandates and, in particular, the manner in which the agency resolves scientific disputes before it.
B.

Judicial Review of EPA’s Scientific Determinations

1.

The Analytical Framework for Judicial Review of EPA’s Scientific
Determinations

As we have indicated above, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Chevron case has
become the nearly universal template for judicial review of the validity of EPA’s statutory
interpretations by the Courts of Appeals. In determining whether those courts had applied a
similarly broad-based analytical framework for the review of EPA’s scientific determinations, we
identified two obvious candidates: the Overton Park163 and State Farm164 cases.165 These are the
seminal Supreme Court decisions setting forth the “reasoned decisionmaking” requirement for
judicial review of questions of fact and policy raised against agency rulemaking.
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Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

164

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

165

Another possibility was Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
Only five cases in our sample cited that case, and among those five, three also cited State Farm
(Southwestern Pennsylvania Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 111 (3d Cir. 1997);
American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1997); and Central Arizona
Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1540 n.8 (9th Cir. 1993)) and another also cited
Overton Park (BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 1995)). EPA
prevailed in all of those cases (except on one issue in American Iron and Steel Inst.), regardless
of whether the challenge was brought by pro-industry or pro-environmental groups. The only
case in which a court cited Baltimore Gas & Elec. without also citing State Farm or Overton
Park, was an unpublished decision, Alaska Miners Ass’n v. EPA, 931 F.2d 896 (Table), 1991
WL 67869 (9th Cir. 1991), in which the court denied an industry petition to overturn EPA’s
decision not to modify effluent limitations for gold placer mines. The courts did not rely on
Baltimore Gas & Elec. as the principal source of the framework for analyzing science challenges.
Where the courts cited that case, however, either alone or in combination with State Farm or
Overton Park, judicial review was deferential and EPA almost invariably prevailed.
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Overton Park involved a challenge by a series of local and national conservation groups
to the decision of the Secretary of Transportation under two federal highway statutes to authorize
the construction of a six-lane interstate highway through a public park in Memphis, Tennessee.
The statutes barred the use of federal funds to finance the construction of highways through
public parks if a “feasible and prudent” alternative route existed.166 Further, construction was
appropriate only if the project included all possible planning to minimize harm to the park.167
The Court determined that the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test168 provided the applicable
standard of review and that the essential inquiry under that test was
whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of
review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency.169
Applying that standard, the Court remanded the case back to the district court “for plenary review
of the Secretary’s decision”170 because the absence of the administrative record prevented the
Court from determining whether the Secretary based his decision on the appropriate statutory
factors.171
State Farm involved judicial review of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s rescission during the first year of the Reagan Administration of a requirement
adopted by the agency during the Carter Administration. The standard mandated that new motor
vehicles be equipped with passive restraints (such as airbags and automatic seatbelts) to protect
vehicle occupants in the event of a collision. Citing Overton Park, the Court deemed the
arbitrary and capricious test to be the applicable standard of judicial review.172 The Court refused
166

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)

(1964)).
167

Id. at 411.

168

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1964).

169

401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted). The Court also indicated that an inquiry into
whether the agency complied with applicable procedural requirements was appropriate. Id. at
417.
170

Id. at 420.

171

The lower courts based their review entirely on litigation affidavits, which the Court
characterized as “post hoc” rationalizations. Id. at 419.
172

State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41.
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to sanction the application of a more deferential standard to the rescission of a rule than to the
promulgation of a rule.173 An agency rescinding “a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis
for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first
instance.”174 Citing Overton Park again, the Court indicated that a court reviewing agency action
under the arbitrary and capricious standard must ascertain whether the decision was based on
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.175 It
then elaborated upon this test as follows:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.176
Applying that standard, the Court held that the rescission of the passive restraint requirement was
arbitrary and capricious because, among other things, the agency failed to consider modifying the
standard to require the use of airbags177 and there was no direct evidence to support the agency’s
finding that detachable automatic seatbelts could not be predicted to yield a substantial increase
in usage of belts by vehicle occupants.178
Our review of the decisions by the Courts of Appeals during the period covered by our
survey indicates that the courts are just as likely to cite neither State Farm nor Overton Park as
they are to cite either one or both of those cases. As table 1 below indicates, the courts cited
State Farm but not Overton Park in 20 of the 66 cases in which EPA’s scientific determinations
were challenged. They cited Overton Park but not State Farm in five cases, and they cited both
decisions in nine cases. In 33 cases, however, the Courts of Appeals cited neither State Farm nor
Overton Park in the portions of their decisions reviewing challenges to EPA’s scientific
determinations. Clearly, then, neither of those two cases has achieved the exalted status that
Chevron has in the context of judicial review of statutory interpretation, and the appellate courts
failed to settle upon either as a universally applicable precedent in science challenges.
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Id.

174

Id. at 42.

175

Id. at 43.

176

Id.

177

Id. at 46.

178

Id. at 52-53.
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The reasons why neither Overton Park nor State Farm has achieved the iconic status of
Chevron among the Courts of Appeals are not entirely clear. Several possibilities present
themselves. First, the lower courts may simply be following the lead of the Supreme Court,
which has not transformed State Farm into a definitive template for application of the APA’s
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. One study of Supreme Court decisions between
1983 and 1993 revealed that the Court cited State Farm in just less than 27% of the cases in
which it applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency’s adjudicatory or rulemaking
decision.179 The Court mentioned the State Farm criteria in just four of those 56 cases. During
the same period, the circuit courts cited State Farm in 38% of the cases in which they applied the
arbitrary and capricious standard to federal agency adjudicatory or rulemaking decisions, and
they mentioned the State Farm criteria in just eleven percent of the cases.180 In our sample, the
Courts of Appeals cited State Farm, either alone or in combination with Overton Park, in just
under 44% of the cases involving review of EPA scientific determinations.181
Second, neither State Farm nor Overton Park contains a crisp articulation of all the
elements of reasoned decisionmaking comparable to the Chevron two-step review. Third, the
courts may tend to view the task of applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency
rule or other action as more context-specific than they do the task of reviewing an agency’s
statutory interpretation. The requirement of reasoned decisionmaking contains many
subcomponents, such as the obligation to consider reasonable alternatives, to articulate a rational
connection between facts and conclusion, to respond to significant comments, and to consider
only relevant factors. Thus, arbitrary and capricious review requires the court to analyze the
agency’s application of law and policy judgments to specific facts. That kind of inquiry may lead
courts to seek out as precedent situations in which the agency was faced with a similar set of
facts or policy judgments. It is common for Court of Appeals decisions to cite more specific
prior authorities on a specific subcomponent from that circuit, especially when there is no
Supreme Court decision on point, rather than invoke the general authority of State Farm or
Overton Park.182
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Shapiro & Levy, note 8, above, at 1067.
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Id.

181

These figures may indicate that reliance on State Farm is growing or just that cases
involving review of EPA determinations are more likely to cite the precedent than cases
involving review of the decisions of agencies lacking a health, safety, or environmental
protection mandate.
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The cases confirm that, in certain contexts, the courts tend to cite their own contextspecific precedents on judicial review of statutory implementation rather than either Overton
Park or State Farm. The cases in which litigants attacked the validity of EPA’s placement of
contaminated properties on the National Priorities List under CERCLA, many of which are
discussed below, provide an example of a set of cases in which the D.C. Circuit consistently
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A fourth factor also relates to context. Overton Park involved judicial review of the
Department of Transportation’s decision, made with virtually no record, in an informal
adjudication. The courts may not view the case as particularly apt when they are reviewing the
validity of a rulemaking decision based on an extensive record. State Farm involved repeal of a
previously issued rule. Perhaps the courts do not perceive the case to provide a generic analytical
framework for judicial review of the validity of newly issued rules.183 Finally, the courts may not
cite either of the two cases as frequently as they do Chevron in statutory interpretation cases
because the government may have less incentive to cite them routinely as governing precedent.
Chevron provides a powerful weapon for an agency seeking judicial deference to its statutory
interpretation. Whether one views Overton Park and State Farm as authorizing relatively
deferential or rigorous review, the agencies lost in both cases.
EPA Won

EPA Lost

Cases
Cited

ProIndustry
Challenge

ProEnvironment
Challenge

Both

Other

ProIndustry
Challenge

ProEnvironment
Challenge

Both

Other

State
Farm

8

1

1

2

10

1

-

1

Overton
Park

3

1

1

-

-

-

-

-

Both

5

2

-

-

2

1

-

-

Neither

15

4

1

2

12

1

-

1

Table 2
Courts of Appeals Reliance on State Farm and Overton Park
Given the small size of the database involved, it is impossible to draw definitive
conclusions from the data in Table 2 about the impact of a court’s decision to cite one or the
other or both of these cases on the outcome of the case. The numbers are nonetheless interesting.
In the five cases in which the courts cited Overton Park but not State Farm, EPA prevailed in

followed this practice.
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The Court in State Farm rejected the argument that judicial review of the rescission of
an agency rule should be judged by the same standard a court would use to assess the validity of
an agency’s refusal to issue a rule in the first place. 463 U.S. at 42-43. The court emphasized
that the case involved changes in previous policy. Of course, so did Chevron.
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every one (three of which involved challenges by pro-industry forces, one of which involved a
challenge by a pro-environmental group, and one of which involved challenges by both sides). In
the twenty cases in which the courts cited State Farm but not Overton Park, EPA prevailed at
least in part in twelve and lost on at least one issue in another twelve.184 In cases in which the
courts cited both Supreme Court opinions, challengers lost in more than twice as many (seven) as
they won (three). In the 33 cases in which the courts cited neither precedent, EPA prevailed at
least in part in 22 cases and lost at least in part in 14 others. Thus, EPA’s record appears to have
been better when the courts cited neither precedent than when they cited State Farm alone, but
not as good as when the courts cited only Overton Park or both Overton Park and State Farm.185

184

In some cases, EPA lost on one or more issues and won on one or more others in the
same case. We have entered such cases in the tables in this section under both the headings
“EPA won” and “EPA lost.” As a result, the numbers entered in the charts may add up to more
than the total number of cases we surveyed.
185

We were initially surprised that the cases citing Overton Park may reflect more
deferential review than the cases citing State Farm. After all, the agency lost in Overton Park as
well as State Farm. It is true that Overton Park characterizes the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
test as “a narrow one,” and warns reviewing courts not to “substitute [their] judgment for that of
the agency.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. The case also mandates a “searching and careful”
review, however. Id. It is possible that courts seeking a deferential analytical framework have
latched onto the initial characterization and warning. But the State Farm Court repeated
precisely that language. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. Thus, a court seeking a deferential
framework could just as easily cite State Farm as Overton Park. Perhaps the explanation lies
elsewhere. Two of our colleagues have posited that a key difference between the two cases is
that Overton Park invites judges not only “to establish their own standards of what an agency
should consider in order to produce an adequately reasoned decision,” but also “to consider the
result reached by the agency, rather than its reasons.” Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
“Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of
Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,” 1987 Duke L.J. 387, 437. State Farm, on the other
hand, “makes clear that the proper focus is not the result reached by an agency , but rather the
reasons given to support that result.” Id. If, as we argue below, judges during our survey period
appeared to be more comfortable identifying gaps in agency reasoning processes than secondguessing agencies on policy-based results and on agency resolution of questions of degree, then
State Farm might afford a more inviting precedent to cite when a court decides to reverse the
agency in a case involving an attack on EPA scientific determinations.
-57-

EPA Won

EPA Lost

Cases
Cited

ProIndustry
Challenge

ProEnvironment
Challenge

Both

Other

ProIndustry
Challenge

ProEnvironment
Challenge

Both

Other

State
Farm

7

-

1

-

7

1

-

1

Overton
Park

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Both

1

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

Neither

14

1

1

1

10

1

-

1

Table 3
The D.C. Circuit’s Reliance on State Farm and Overton Park
As Table 3 indicates, our figures also reveal that the D.C. Circuit was more inclined than
the Courts of Appeals as a whole were to cite State Farm than to cite the Overton Park
precedent. In the 40 cases we reviewed, the D.C. Circuit never cited Overton Park alone,
whereas it cited State Farm alone in 12 cases involving 17 sets of issues.
As we have indicated above, the Court in State Farm quoted from and relied on its
previous decision in Overton Park in describing the content of the arbitrary and capricious
standard as applied to judicial review of the manner in which an agency applies its substantive
enabling authority. Moreover, the versions of the standard enunciated in both cases have at least
one factor in common – whether the agency based its decision on a consideration of the factors
made relevant by the statute.186 It appears that the Courts of Appeals engage in the same kind of
inquiry, and consider the same factors, whether or not they invoke State Farm or Overton Park,
even if their review tends to be more deferential under the Overton Park rubric. Table 4 breaks
down the percentage of the cases involving EPA science challenges in which the attacks on
EPA’s determinations reflected each of the factors set forth in the two cases.
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Analysis of whether the agency considered relevant factors may involve inquiries into
two separate but related factors listed in State Farm – whether the agency failed to consider
relevant factors and whether it considered irrelevant factors.
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Factor

Pro-Environment

Pro-Industry

Totals

# of cases
raising this
challenge

% of
total

# of cases in
which
argument
prevailed

# of cases
raising this
challenge

% of
total

# of cases
in which
argument
prevailed

# of cases
raising
this
challenge

# of cases
in which
plaintiff
prevailed

Failed to consider
relevant factors

11

24

0

25

32

5

36

5

Considered irrelevant
factors

5

11

0

5

6

0

10

0

Failed to consider
alternatives

5

11

0

5

6

1

10

1

Insufficient factual
basis

10

22

3

25

32

11

35

14

Inadequate
explanation

8

18

7

14

18

13

22

20

Inadequate Notice

7

16

5

17

22

7

24

12

Failed to respond to
comments

2

4

0

14

18

3

16

3

Table 4
Basis for and Outcome of EPA Science Challenges
Table 4 reveals that pro-industry litigants brought more challenges in five of the seven
identified categories than did their pro-environment counterparts and an equal number of
challenges in the remaining two categories (considered irrelevant factors and failed to consider
alternatives). For both categories of challengers, the least successful attack involved the charge
that the agency considered irrelevant factors. The agency never lost on that ground. The claim
that the agency failed to consider alternatives was little more successful. Pro-environment
litigants never won on that ground, and only one pro-industry litigant prevailed on that ground.
Both categories of claimants had considerable success in arguing that EPA provided inadequate
notice. Pro-environment groups prevailed in five of the seven cases in which they leveled that
charge, while industry litigants won in seven of the 17 cases in which they grounded their attack
on inadequate notice. Both categories of litigants were notably less successful on the other
purely procedural ground – that EPA failed to respond to comments. Environmental groups
never won on that ground, while industry challengers won in three of fourteen cases in which the
issue was raised.187
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Industry litigants raised a failure to respond argument in a much higher percentage of
cases than did pro-environment litigants.
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Of the more substantive factors, the one demonstrating the greatest discrepancy in proenvironment and pro-industry success rates was failure to consider relevant factors.
Environmental groups never prevailed on this ground, while industry challengers won 20% of the
time. This difference may indicate that while EPA is rarely if ever susceptible to the charge that
it completely ignored its principal mandate by failing to consider the extent to which its
contemplated action would protect health and the environment, it was more susceptible to
charges that it ignored factors likely to be the focus of industrial concern, such as cost and
technological feasibility.
At least two other points jump out from the numbers in Table 4. First, both proenvironment and pro-industry litigants had remarkable success arguing that EPA provided an
inadequate explanation for its actions. The environmental groups won in seven of the eight cases
in which the courts addressed that concern, while pro-industry groups won in thirteen of fourteen
cases. This was the argument that had by far the highest success rates of the arguments on which
the Courts of Appeals ruled in the science cases. Perhaps this success rate is attributable to the
catch-all nature of the category. Courts unsatisfied with the agency’s reasoning process may
have been more inclined to strike down action on the ground of inadequate explanation,
regardless of the nature of the specific defects. Second, pro-industry groups were more
successful (eleven out of 22 cases) than were pro-environment groups (three out of ten cases) in
arguing that EPA provided an inadequate factual basis for its decision.
The figures in Table 4 seem to raise more questions than they answer. For one thing, as
noted above, the inadequate explanation factor is so amorphous that it is difficult to determine
what kinds of defects in agency explanations were the most likely to prove fatal to the validity of
the action being challenged. The insufficient factual basis factor raises a similar problem. The
figures in Table 4 do not make it possible to identify what kinds of factual gaps most troubled the
courts or why pro-industry litigants were relatively more successful at convincing the courts that
such gaps existed. The raw numbers also fail to provide much enlightenment on the question of
whether the cases verify or refute the notion that EPA has engaged in “bad science” in a
significant percentage of the cases in which its scientific reasoning has been challenged.
The next section explores the science cases in more detail with the aim of digging deeper
into the resolution of science challenges by the Courts of Appeals to determine if any more useful
patterns emerge. The discussion focuses first on the cases in which the Courts of Appeals upheld
EPA’s decisions in the face of attacks on the agency’s science either by pro-environment or proindustry groups and then proceeds to analyze the cases in which the courts struck down EPA’s
decisions based on the ground that it implemented its statutory mandate improperly. Within each
group of cases, we have created two categories of decisions: those in which the attacks on EPA’s
science focused upon flaws in the agency’s data collection and interpretation and those in which
litigants attacked the persuasiveness or consistency of the agency’s reasoning process. In other
words, the first category focuses on the adequacy of the agency’s factual basis (the fourth factor
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in Table 4), while the second hones in on the adequacy of its explanation (the fifth factor).188
We determined in our review of the statutory interpretation cases that the Courts of
Appeals during our survey period tended to be leery of second-guessing the political branches on
questions that required it to evaluate whether one policy judgment was better or worse than
another, because deciding such questions of degree, or weighing conflicting policy interests, is
peculiarly the province of the agency, while they were more comfortable making the formalistic
or linguistic judgments required to determine whether the statute was clear. The divergence
manifested itself in a greater rate of reversal at Step One than at Step two of the Chevron process.
We were interested in determining whether a similar pattern would emerge from a study of the
cases involving judicial review of EPA’s scientific determinations, and if so, why. We also
tested in Part II above the hypothesis that the mindset of what we called a “Scalian judge” could
well explain a systematic disagreement between agency decisionmakers and judges on the clarity
of statutory text. We wondered whether a similar mindset might explain some of the results in
the statutory implementation cases.
One possible starting point in the search for an answer to these questions is in Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in the Mistretta case,189 where the majority upheld the
constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines it issued.
Although Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s conclusion that the Guidelines did not
contravene the separation of powers, he agreed with its holding that Congress did not engage in
an excessive delegation of legislative power to the Commission. Justice Scalia found judicial
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine to be problematic:
Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that
some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be
left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over
unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but
over a question of degree.190
Because Congress is “better equipped to inform itself of the ‘necessities’ of government” and
since the factors bearing upon those necessities are multifarious and highly political, “it is small
wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
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permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”191
By contrast, in Justice Scalia’s view, the courts are perfectly well equipped to enforce the
structural provisions of the Constitution by characterizing, for example, the nature of a power
executed by an administrative entity. In that case, Justice Scalia concluded that the Commission
was improperly exercising legislative as opposed to executive or judicial functions.192
It is possible that a Scalian judge would draw a similar distinction judging attacks on
EPA scientific determinations. Such a judge would be reluctant to become embroiled in
assessments of questions of degree, and would be more willing to assess whether EPA had
committed some more categorical failure to discharge statutory or administrative responsibilities
at all. Such either-or determinations include assessing whether the agency had reached a
conclusion without any factual support, failed completely to explain a link in its reasoning
process, failed completely to take into account a relevant consideration, or engaged in
inconsistent reasoning.193 None of these bases for reversal turns on a question of degree and none
entails review of questions over which agency policymakers possess an obvious advantage over
judges in institutional competence. As the analysis below indicates, our review of the cases that
involve attacks on EPA’s scientific reasoning indicates that the case results are consistent with
such a judicial inclination to avoid immersing the judiciary in the adjudication of questions of
degree.
2.

Cases in which the Courts Upheld the Validity of EPA’s Scientific Reasoning
a.

Attacks on EPA’s Data Collection and Interpretation
(1)

Data Collection

Attacks based on the nature of the evidence upon which EPA relied in making its
scientific determinations were uniformly unsuccessful during the survey period. We could not
identify any cases in which EPA lost because of the data selection choices it made. Instead, the
courts always deferred to these choices. In one case, for example, the D.C. Circuit deferred to
EPA’s decision to rely on sixty-day instead of four-day studies of the bioaccumulation of toxic
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from the ranks of successful lawyers, are therefore well qualified to spot logical weaknesses in
arguments and gaps in reasoning.”).
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chemicals in trout in deciding to list a substance as a hazardous waste under RCRA.194 In another
case, the same court concluded that EPA reasonably decided to include data from commercial
Subtitle C waste management facilities wastes in defining the scope of an exemption from
RCRA regulation for hazardous wastes. It also held that the agency acted reasonably in applying
the low hazard criterion used to determine eligibility for the exemption to data from only two
lead processing facilities because those facilities represented forty percent of the plants in the
industry.195 In other cases, the courts rejected contentions that the data EPA relied on were too
old.196
EPA’s decisions to reject data or studies based on flaws identified by the agency were
similarly immune from successful attack. The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s decision not to rely on
short-term animal studies that failed to address pulmonary irritation in assessing a chemical’s
toxicity for purposes of the toxic release inventory compiled under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).197 In another case, that court remarked that EPA
could, “within reasonable bounds, specify what data is [sic] necessary for it to determine how
many allowances [to emit sulfur dioxide] a facility should receive [under the acid deposition
control program of the Clean Air Act]. . . . The EPA may then refuse to act if the data submitted
is of uncertain authenticity.”198
The courts firmly agreed with the principle that EPA need not base its regulatory
decisions on perfect evidence. The Fifth Circuit concluded, for example, that EPA did not act
arbitrarily in proceeding on the basis of imperfect information in issuing zero discharge levels
under the Clean Water Act for produced water, produced sand, and drilling wastes from oil and
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gas producing point sources.199 In rejecting an attack on the adequacy of EPA’s database, the
D.C. Circuit explained pithily that “[i]nadequate data, however, do not mean inadequate
science.”200 At least two different circuits repeated the language from the D.C. Circuit’s highly
deferential, landmark 1976 Clean Air Act decision in Ethyl Corporation201 to the effect that EPA
is authorized to rely on “suspected, but not completely substantiated, relationships between facts,
from trends among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, from probative
preliminary data not yet certifiable as ‘fact,’ and the like.”202
The appellate courts also routinely rejected challenges to EPA’s scientific determinations
if they regarded them as unsupported by any relevant evidence or as based on conclusory
assertions or speculation. In one case, the court refused to take EPA to task for ignoring “new
scientific evidence” proffered by industry on the issue of the existence of safe threshold levels of
exposure to known or probable human carcinogens because the evidence was limited to the
opinions of a few scientists that were concededly at odds with generally accepted views.203 In
another, an industrial litigant claiming that its product was a recyclable material rather than a
solid waste under RCRA failed to field test any of the products that its experts testified “might
possibly be manufactured” from its slag material.204 A truck manufacturing and assembly plant
that sought review of EPA’s disapproval of a state implementation plan revision under the Clean
Air Act that would have afforded it additional time to comply lost because it was unable to cite
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any evidence at all that it could not comply on time.205
The courts were similarly unreceptive to challenges filed by litigants who failed to supply
information requested by EPA during the course of its decisionmaking process. In one case, the
D.C. Circuit noted that the utilities did not comply with an EPA notice describing the
information the agency needed to allocate allowances, and on this basis turned aside the
contention that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in calculating the number of emission
allowances to dole out to electric utilities under the Clean Air Act’s acid deposition control
program.206 A truck manufacturing and assembly plant lost its attack on EPA’s disapproval of a
state implementation plan revision in part because both it and the state failed to submit a survey
requested by EPA and because the plant failed to demonstrate that it proceeded expeditiously to
develop and implement compliance plans, as requested by EPA.207 The producer of a substance
deemed unacceptable by EPA as a substitute for banned ozone-depleting substances also lost its
bid to invalidate the designation because its failure to supply requested information precluded
EPA from ruling on the basis of a complete record. The court stated that even though the
company “may at times have felt stonewalled by EPA, [it] had only itself to blame for not
pursuing leads offered by EPA officials and the outside consultant.”208
The cases in which the courts were called upon to determine whether EPA erred in its
data selection process thus reveal an unwillingness on the part of the judges to assess whether
EPA went far enough in collecting data or whether the data it collected were adequate or recent
enough to support the agency’s scientific determinations. The judges seemed unwilling to set
themselves up as arbiters of the propriety or extent of EPA’s information collection and
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winnowing processes.209 They rejected challenges on the ground that the challenges were based
entirely on speculation and were without any evidentiary support, and they relied on litigants’
failure to cooperate with EPA’s information-gathering efforts as a justification for turning aside
attacks on EPA’s science.
(2)

Data Interpretation

The judges’ reluctance to draw lines in determining whether the agency made appropriate
judgments in selecting the information base for its scientific determinations extended to judicial
review of the manner in which EPA interpreted the data it had collected. When both EPA and
the petitioners produced evidence to support their positions, the courts typically deferred to
EPA’s interpretation of the weight of the evidence rather than deciding that the challengers’
evidence was stronger than the evidence relied on by EPA. This deferential posture even
appeared in cases in which the courts otherwise took EPA to task. In the American Trucking
case, for example, the D.C. Circuit remanded to EPA its revisions to both the ozone and
particulate matter national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS).210 Yet the panel majority that
remanded the standards rejected industry’s argument that EPA lacked any basis for regulating
coarse particulate matter. The court found that the record contained adequate evidence to justify
a decision to regulate coarse particulate pollution. The relationship between coarse particulates
and adverse health effects was well established when EPA set the initial particulate matter
standard. Further, studies in the record suggested that the portion of coarse particulate
unaccounted for by the pre-existing standard for finer particles explained some of the observed
adverse health effects. Some of the particulate problem therefore seemed independently
attributable to coarse particles. The industry challengers pointed to some evidence to the
contrary, but the court refused to conclude that EPA’s reading of the evidence was
unreasonable.211
The courts have similarly refused to second guess EPA in its selection of the technology
that qualified as the best available under the Clean Water Act,212 in its selection of the
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appropriate target cancer risk range for hazardous substance cleanups under CERCLA,213 or in its
selection of the appropriate cutoff point for determining which wastes met the high volume
criterion for special wastes subject to exclusion from hazardous waste regulation under RCRA.214
The Fourth Circuit refused to overturn EPA’s approval of state water quality standards for dioxin
under the Clean Water Act on the basis of EPA’s selection of a bioconcentration factor of 5000
instead of the higher level supported by the environmental group challengers. According to the
court, the “best course of action is to leave this debate to the world of science to ultimately be
resolved by those with specialized training in this field.”215 In cases such as these, as long as
EPA’s choices fell within what was often a rather ill-defined “zone of reasonableness,”216 EPA
prevailed.
Thus, the courts seemed disinclined to wade too deeply into the resolution of questions of
degree. If the courts detected conflicting evidence, some of which supported EPA’s position and
some of which did not, they tended to endorse the agency’s position as reasonable,217 even if the
courts could not always “fully grasp” the agency’s technical explanation.218 In the Leather
CWA is capable of removing dissolved oil from produced water generated by offshore oil and
gas producers, even though studies supplied by industry supported the conclusion that it was not
capable of doing so).
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Industries case, for example, the court acknowledged the “genuine scientific debate” concerning
the extent to which trivalent chromium poses environmental risks on the basis of its potential to
oxidize into hexavalent chromium, a known toxic substance. The court concluded that EPA did
not abuse its discretion in deciding to regulate trivalent chromium in sewage sludge destined for
land application.219 Perhaps the best summary of this trend was expressed by the D.C. Circuit,
which seemed relieved that, “happily, it is not for the judicial branch to undertake comparative
evaluation of conflicting evidence.”220
A few notable counterexamples stand out against these general tendencies. In the
Corrosion Proof Fittings case,221 the Fifth Circuit panel that struck down EPA’s rules phasing
out the use of asbestos-containing products under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
characterized as arbitrary EPA’s choice of a period for discounting its cost and benefit
calculations.222 The court also concluded that EPA’s willingness to spend $23.7 million to save
less than one-third of a life “reveals that its economic review of its regulations, as required by
TSCA, was meaningless,” and that EPA engaged in “cavalier treatment of its duty to consider the
economic effects of its decisions,” even as the court protested that “we do not sit as a regulatory
agency that must make the difficult decision as to what an appropriate expenditure is to prevent
someone from incurring the risk of an asbestos-related death.”223 In the American Trucking case,
the court did not itself draw a line as to the appropriate level at which to set the disputed Clean
Air Act NAAQS, but it took EPA to task for failing to provide an intelligible principle against
which to measure the point at which EPA drew the line.224 EPA’s decision not to pick either a
higher or lower level than it did was plagued with indeterminacy. “Thus, the agency rightly
recognizes that the question is one of degree, but offers no intelligible principle by which to
should ensure that enough background explanation is provided so that non-specialists can
understand the significance of the points that are made.”
219
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identify a stopping point.”225 In another case, the Ninth Circuit decided that it owed no deference
to EPA’s line-drawing because the agency lacked data to support exempting construction sites of
less than five acres from the Clean Water Act’s stormwater permit requirement.226
Just as judges are disinclined to make comparative evaluations of the quality of the data
EPA employs, they are also disinclined to decide whether petitioners’ interpretation of the data is
superior to the agency’s. The Ninth Circuit, for example, rejected claims that EPA
misinterpreted the data contained in a study prepared by the National Park Service on the sources
of visibility impairment at the Grand Canyon.227 The D.C. Circuit endorsed EPA’s reliance on
lake bottom sediments as evidence that mercury levels were attributable to mining operations
rather than naturally occurring, even though industry contended that the agency lacked evidence
of a direct causal connection to those operations.228 It also deferred to EPA’s decision to use data
that aggregated the volumes of individual waste streams to calculate waste stream-specific
volume thresholds for exempting mineral processing wastes from regulation as hazardous wastes
under RCRA.229
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The disinclination to judge competing interpretations shows up clearly in the courts’
reluctance to endorse the opinions of petitioners’ experts over EPA’s experts. In one case, the
D.C. Circuit held that EPA did not act arbitrarily in giving greater weight to mainstream
scientists who supported the position that there are no known safe threshold levels of exposure to
known and probable human carcinogens than to opposing views of “a few scientists.”230 In
another case, the Fifth Circuit endorsed as reasonable EPA’s decision to rely on the view of its
experts that a process burned instead of recovered metal-bearing wastes or their metallic
constituents, despite the contrary views of industry’s experts. “The choice of which experts to
credit,” the court opined, “belongs to the EPA permitting staff.”231
Instead of, or in addition to, offering competing interpretations of data, petitioners
frequently challenge the legitimacy of EPA’s methods for extrapolating existing data into areas in
which it lacked information. The courts give EPA leeway here, too. In one case, the D.C.
Circuit held that EPA reasonably relied on animal test data to extrapolate the risk of exposure to
a chemical it classified as an extremely hazardous substance under EPCRA and deferred to
EPA’s decision to extrapolate across physical states (from exposure in aerosol form to exposure
in vapor form).232 In another, the same court condoned EPA’s decision under the same statute to
include on the toxic release inventory polychlorinated alkanes derived from an olefin based on
their structural similarity to polychlorinated alkanes derived from a paraffin.233 The Fifth Circuit
allowed EPA to justify not collecting data on the performance of older oil and gas wells before
establishing effluent limitations for them under the Clean Water Act by relying upon
extrapolations from data collected concerning newer wells.234
This trend extends to cases in which EPA has employed admittedly imperfect scientific or
statistical models. EPA was able to defend the application of regression analysis to predict
emission levels of oxides of nitrogen from electric utilities in the face of the contention that its
analysis was arbitrary, even though some actual data points did not correspond exactly with the
line described by the regression equation.235 According to one court, EPA need only provide
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evidence of a rational relationship between the model and the situation to which it applied.236
The D.C. Circuit concluded that EPA’s explanation for adding a site to CERCLA’s NPL passed
muster even though EPA based the listing on the threat the site posed to groundwater, the
evidence indicated that contamination was confined to the upper portion of the aquifer, drinking
water supplies had been drawn exclusively from the clean lower portion, and the aquifer was no
longer used as a drinking water source.237 The court remarked on “the seemingly unfair effects of
the overly formalistic approach followed by EPA,” but felt constrained to deny the petition
because case law had endorsed EPA’s use of formulas in applying the hazard ranking system
used to assess potential NPL sites.238 In other situations, as we indicate below, the fit between
the model and the situation to which it was applied was so flawed that challenges to EPA’s
scientific determinations succeeded.239
In some cases, EPA succeeded in defending its policy decisions by claiming that it lacked
sufficient information to take the steps or adopt the position sought by a litigant or that it was
engaged in ongoing efforts to accumulate additional information. The general principle seemed
to be that “where existing methodology or research in a new area of regulation is deficient, the
agency necessarily enjoys broad discretion to attempt to formulate a solution to the best of its
ability on the basis of available information.”240 The courts relied on some variant of that
sentiment to reject attacks on EPA’s science lodged by pro-environment and pro-industry forces
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In Board of Regents v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1996), for example, the court
noted that as EPA imposes more and more demanding requirements on its laboratory contractors,
it is more and more likely that a lab will fail to comply with all of them. Laboratory errors are
not necessarily “fatally defective” for that reason.
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alike. In a case in which environmental groups challenged EPA’s establishment of total
maximum daily loads for dioxin under the Clean Water Act, the Ninth Circuit held that EPA did
not act improperly by failing to consider the presence of other chemicals in the water, because
information concerning the ability of other compounds to bioconcentrate to toxic levels was not
as available as was information on dioxin.241 The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s decision not to
issue numeric limits for safe levels of toxic substances in sludge co-disposed in municipal solid
waste landfills on related grounds. It deferred to EPA’s explanation that it could not measure
chemical interactions between pollutants in sewage sludge and solid waste and had insufficient
data about the chemical composition of debris in landfills.242 The same court held that EPA did
not have to consider whether pollution prevention measures were achievable means of limiting
medical waste incinerator emissions under the Clean Air Act when the record contained no
quantification of the costs or benefits of complying with such measures.243 An industry litigant
could not convince the D.C. Circuit that EPA improperly failed to account for biodegradation of
chloroform in its subsurface transport model for applying the toxicity characteristic leaching
procedure test under RCRA.244 The data submitted by industry failed to account for pH and
temperature variations in different subsurface environments about which EPA lacked sufficient
information to accurately model anaerobic degradation in the subsurface.245
The cases decided during our survey period in which pro-environment or pro-industry
litigants attacked the validity of EPA’s scientific determinations on the ground that EPA erred in
its data selection choices or that EPA interpreted the data improperly thus reflect a disinclination
on the part of the reviewing courts to make judgments about the merits of particular pieces of
evidence or about whether, on balance, the evidence provided by the challengers was stronger
than that provided by EPA.246 The courts also seemed unwilling to wade into the middle of a
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Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1995).
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit rejected environmental groups’ claim that EPA improperly failed to
protect sensitive subpopulations in approving state water quality standards for dioxin based on an
estimate that an individual eats 6.5 grams of fish per day. The fish consumption of these
subpopulations was speculative at best and there was no evidence that the fish they consume
were contaminated. NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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When the judges became convinced that the challengers affirmatively mischaracterized
the nature of the decision made by EPA or of the challenge being raised to that decision, they
typically reacted by dismissing the challenge. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135
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battle of the experts, tending to defer to the views of the experts relied on by EPA when both
sides of a scientific challenge presented plausible opinions. Finally, the courts afforded EPA
considerable leeway in accommodating gaps in information by endorsing EPA’s extrapolations
and modeling exercises in situations in which those techniques were not obviously flawed.
b.

Attacks on EPA’s Reasoning Process

The analysis EPA performs in a rulemaking determination typically involves three
distinct components, each of which may include multiple steps. The agency must select the
evidence upon which it will rely, it must interpret that evidence to answer questions relevant to
the rulemaking, and it must exercise policy judgment in selecting an appropriate response to the
evidence, as interpreted. In each of these stages, EPA must make choices: as to which evidence
is most reliable, as to which inferences to draw from the evidence, and as to which action to take.
The State Farm requirement that the agency engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” in this
analysis can be understood as a two-step process similar to Chevron’s, although it is not often
formulated this way. First, like a high school math instructor explaining to students how to take
an algebra quiz, State Farm says that you must “show your work.” The agency cannot simply
state its bottom line conclusion. It must articulate the reasoning process it went through to reach
that conclusion. Second, just as the steps in the student’s proof must be logically correct, State
Farm says that the reasoning the agency employs must be “satisfactory.” The court asks whether
EPA “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' "247
The analogy between an algebra quiz and a rulemaking is only suggestive, though, as the
distinction between “logically correct” and “satisfactory” intimates. In working through to a
rulemaking decision, the agency must make judgments along the way that cannot be derived
logically from the preceding steps. Determining the “weight of the evidence,” selecting a model
to use in extrapolating from the evidence to factual conclusions relevant to the rulemaking,
deciding what inferences to draw from evidence or prior inferences, and weighing conflicting
policy objectives in fashioning appropriate administrative agency all are operations that cannot

F.3d 791, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (industry claimed its challenge was based on cost/ton removed
calculation, while it was in fact based on cost/kwh, which industry had previously argued
unsuccessfully to the court was required by the statute); Central Arizona Water Conservation
Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1544 (9th Cir. 1993) (author of report relied on by challengers stated
that challengers misrepresented content of report). Loss of credibility therefore did not stand
these litigants in good stead with the courts.
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Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(citations omitted).
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be based on logically correct axioms or scientifically validated.248 The court’s review of the
agency’s reasoning will therefore always involve some possibility of subjective differences
between the agency and the court with regard to whether or not each of the links in the agency’s
chain of reasoning was satisfactory.
In our earlier consideration of Chevron, we argued that judges generally leery of secondguessing the political branches regarding questions of degree, such as whether one policy
consideration outweighed another, would be more likely to reverse an agency on Step One
grounds than on Step Two grounds, and that is what we found to be the case. The prior section
of this part, which reviewed the cases in which litigants attacked the data collection and
interpretation steps of EPA’s scientific determinations, was also consistent with this hypothesis,
because in the decisions we reviewed, the courts were highly reluctant to second-guess the
agency regarding which evidence was more or less convincing. If this reluctance extends to
“reasoned decisionmaking” review (review of the agency’s policy response to the evidence it has
collected and interpreted during the first two steps of the process), we would expect that courts
would be more willing to reverse EPA on the basis of a missing link, a gap in the chain of
reasoning, than it would be to reverse on the basis of its conclusion that an articulated inference
was an unsatisfactory one. In the former situation, the court informs the agency that the agency
simply has not shown its work, so that the court does not know what the agency’s reasoning
process was, rather than informing the agency that the court understands the agency’s reasoning,
a good portion of which is policy-driven, and rejects it.
Under this hypothesis, the more common grounds for finding that the agency has not
“articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made,” ought to be: (1) a move from one step in the agency’s thinking
to another was completely unexplained; (2) how the agency dealt with a highly relevant
consideration was completely unarticulated; (3) a conclusion that ought to be based on evidence
lacked any basis in fact or any supporting evidence; (4) the agency’s reasoning was internally
inconsistent without explanation as to why, either within that specific rule or when compared to
past practice. In addition, because the court will be judging this reasoning process within a
specific statutory context that sets boundaries on agency action, a court might find that (5) the
reasoning or the conclusion of the agency was incompatible with statutory criteria. Each of these
grounds for reversal is a variation on the conclusion that the chain of the agency’s reasoning
contains a gap, or a missing link – something lacking any explanation – rather than the
conclusion that the court finds the link to be there but to be too weak to bear its weight. The first
kind of judgment can be cast in categorical, absolute terms, without relying upon a disagreement
between the court and the agency with respect to a question of degree. Our review of the cases
248

For instance, the National Research Council has estimated that the risk assessment
process common to many EPA rules involves approximately fifty inferential bridges - points in
reaching the ultimate risk assessment conclusion at which a choice must be made “among several
scientifically plausible options.” NRC, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, Managing
the Process 8 (1983).
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confirms that these are precisely the grounds upon which the Courts of Appeals in the 1990s
tended to find EPA’s scientific determinations to be unsupported by reasoned decisionmaking.
The following section addresses judicial review by the Courts of Appeals during our
survey period of the third component of the typical rulemaking determination, the point in the
process at which EPA selects an appropriate, policy-based response to the evidence it has
accumulated and interpreted. We divide the cases both in this section, in which we discuss
unsuccessful attacks on EPA’s reasoning process, and the next, in which we discuss successful
attacks, into two categories. The first encompasses challenges to the persuasiveness of EPA’s
policy-based reasoning, or its logical coherence. The second includes cases in which litigants
objected to EPA’s reasoning on the ground that it was inconsistent with applicable statutory
mandates.
(1)

Persuasiveness of EPA’s Reasoning

It is perhaps not as easy for a reviewing court asked to review the persuasiveness of an
agency’s reasoning process to avoid making comparative judgments as it is when it is asked to
review the validity of that agency’s data selection and interpretation choices. The persuasiveness
of the reasoning used to support a particular outcome is largely a subjective matter.
Nevertheless, an agency’s reasoning could be deemed faulty if the agency completely fails to
consider a relevant consideration or if one or more steps in a logical chain of inference are
completely missing. If the judges during the survey period were as wary of making comparative
judgments about EPA’s reasoning processes in cases involving the application of scientific
expertise as they were in assessing the agency’s data selection and interpretation choices, one
would expect most of the judicial reversals of EPA reasoning in the science cases to involve the
identification of this kind of fault. To a certain extent, the cases discussed in this section and the
next bear out that hypothesis.
The courts on occasion concluded that EPA did not entirely fail to consider an important
aspect of the problem at hand. In a case that arose under the Clean Air Act, for example, the
Third Circuit held that EPA considered data indicating that transported ozone contributed to
exceedances of the NAAQS.249 Another ground upon which a court could find that an agency
acted arbitrarily without engaging in a weighing of the cogency of its reasoning process would be
to reverse on the basis of the agency’s failure to consider or respond to objections raised by
interested parties. In several cases during the survey period, the Courts of Appeals refused to
invalidate EPA’s decisions on these grounds. In one case, an industry litigant claimed that EPA
erred in banning the use of certain substances as substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals
banned by the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The D.C. Circuit rejected the attack,
noting “the comprehensive scope of EPA’s responses to OZ’s submissions and OZ’s utter lack of
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explanation as to how EPA’s responses might be inaccurate or unfounded.”250 In another case,
the same court concluded that EPA had not failed to respond to the charge that some animal
carcinogencity experiments it relied on were conducted at excessively high doses.251 In yet
another, the Ninth Circuit determined that a miners association challenging EPA’s refusal to
modify its Clean Water Act effluent limitations for gold placer mines failed to provide
“unanswerable criticism” of EPA’s reasoning in that, contrary to the association’s assertion, EPA
considered and rejected a compliance cost estimate that differed from its own.252 The Fourth
Circuit overturned a district court decision invalidating EPA’s decision to veto a dredge and fill
permit for a dam under the Clean Water Act because, the district court’s finding to the contrary
notwithstanding, EPA did consider whether environmentally destructive development would be
worse if the dam were not built than if it were.253
Some courts were able to avoid making comparative judgments by rejecting attacks on
EPA’s methodology where the alleged defect was irrelevant to the reasoning process engaged in
by the agency. In a Clean Water Act case brought before the Fifth Circuit,254 industry attacked
the validity of a study EPA supposedly relied on in issuing effluent limitation guidelines that
included zero discharge levels for produced water, produced sand, and drilling wastes discharged
by coastal oil and gas producers. The court refused to address criticisms of the study because the
study was used by EPA to estimate pollution reduction benefits that would result from the zero
discharge limit and, in issuing BAT effluent limitations, EPA is not required to compare cost and
effluent reduction benefits. So “even serious flaws could not provide grounds for remanding the
zero discharge limit.”255 In another Clean Water Act case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
contention that EPA improperly relied on pot instead of field studies in setting a cap for the
concentration of chromium in sewage sludge. Industry claimed that these studies were
inadequate to model plant uptake, but EPA used the studies to measure risk to plants once
chromium is in plant tissue (phytotoxicity), not to measure uptake from soil.256
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Leather Indus. of Am., Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In another case,
the court rejected an attack on EPA’s scientific reasoning not because the alleged flaw in the
agency’s methodology was irrelevant to the reasoning process in which it engaged, but because
the challenge focused exclusively on one justification for EPA’s action, whereas that justification
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Two other bases for upholding EPA’s decisions in the face of attacks on its reasoning
process are noteworthy. First, it helped EPA to fend off attacks on its scientific reasoning to be
able to assert that it had provided for individual adjustment mechanisms to deal with the
unintended, anomalous consequences of applying the scientific approach or technical model it
had developed. In the 1997 American Iron and Steel Institute case, for example, an iron and steel
association petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of water quality guidance EPA had issued for
the Great Lakes system. The association challenged as arbitrary the requirement in the guidance
that a mixing zone encompass no more than 25% of the design flow of the receiving water.257
The court held that EPA adequately justified its decision to establish uniform default dimensions
for mixing zones in part because the guidance authorized permitting authorities to make
adjustments in individual permit proceedings upon a showing that 25% of river flow did not
correspond to 25% of cross-sectional area or that EPA’s assumptions concerning the scope of the
areas in which discharge-induced mixing normally occurs were inappropriate.258 Along the same
lines, the D.C. Circuit swept aside an attack on EPA’s regulations setting limits for NOx
emissions from electric utility boilers under the Clean Air Act. The regulations were not
arbitrary simply because EPA did not build a compliance margin into the limits; both the statute
and EPA’s implementing regulations provided alternative emission limitations and averaging
options.259
Second, the courts sometimes looked askance at attacks on EPA’s scientific methodology
when the attacking entity failed to provide a workable alternative approach. In one case, the D.C.
Circuit upheld EPA’s methodology for setting emission limits under the Clean Air Act for oxides
of nitrogen emitted by electric utilities, noting that the challenging utility “does not propose an
alternative to the methodology EPA employed.”260 The same court turned aside industry’s attack
on the Great Lakes water quality guidance, remarking in the process that while industry listed
alternatives for converting narrative criteria into numerical values, “it has not even attempted to
convince us that these are superior to EPA’s methodology.”261 The operator of an industrial
furnace leveled an unsuccessful attack on EPA’s scientific methodology under RCRA when it
failed to supply any alternative set of standards to replace EPA’s reliance on state Department of

was only one of several EPA relied on. See Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. EPA, 941 F.2d 1339,
1358 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Id. at 998. See also id. at 1005 (noting that the guidance allowed permitting authorities
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Transportation specifications for purchases of aggregate.262
The absence of a workable alternative approach to the one selected by EPA also doomed
a chemical marketer’s attack on EPA’s denial of a petition to remove one of its chemicals from
the list of extremely hazardous substances under EPCRA.263 The marketer alleged that EPA
acted arbitrarily in choosing to assess the risk posed to animals through exposure to a chemical
called IPDI in its aerosol instead of its vapor form because the latter was arguably more
representative of likely human exposure. The court concluded that the chemical’s toxicity could
only be measured by using high concentrations of the chemical, and the substance’s low vapor
pressure therefore necessitated the use of aerosol tests. EPA therefore did not err in relying on
aerosol tests to assess the toxicity of exposure through inhalation, “even though these tests utilize
artificially high concentrations of IPDI and involve aerosol IPDI instead of IPDI vapor.”264
(2)

Consistency of EPA’s Reasoning with the Statute

One would expect judges as a general proposition to be more comfortable engaging in an
assessment of the consistency of an agency’s reasoning process with statutory criteria or
objectives than they would be making judgments about technical matters such as the propriety of
the agency’s decision to rely more heavily on one kind of data or one expert opinion than
another. In cases in which pro-environment or pro-industry litigants attacked the validity of
EPA’s reasoning process on the basis of inconsistency with the agency’s statutory authorization,
the courts in some cases nevertheless adopted a relatively deferential review posture.
At least one court refused to endorse an attack on EPA’s reasoning when doing so would
have prevented EPA from fulfilling its statutory environmental protection mandate. In the
American Trucking case, the non-state petitioners argued that the fine particle standard
established by EPA was flawed because EPA failed to explain the biological mechanism through
which particulate pollution causes adverse health effects. They claimed that the absence of proof
of causation (how particles actually interact with cells and organs to cause sickness and death)
was a fatal mistake. The court disagreed, because the statute265 does not require that kind of

262

Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. EPA, 81 F.3d 1371, 1384 (5th Cir. 1996). A group of
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proof, and the court had previously endorsed “reasonable extrapolations from some reliable
evidence.”266 Moreover, if the petitioners’ argument were correct, “EPA (or any agency for that
matter) would be powerless to act whenever it first recognizes clear trends of mortality or
morbidity in areas dominated by a particular pathogen.”267 Accordingly, the court upheld EPA’s
decision to establish a fine particle standard in a situation in which accepting the petitioners’
challenge to that decision would essentially have made it impossible (given the current state of
knowledge – or lack of knowledge) to fulfill EPA’s statutory mandate to protect the public health
and the environment from air pollution. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit refused in another case to
require EPA to include in its regression analysis for calculating percentage reductions in oxides
of nitrogen emissions variables for which no data existed because to do so would either have
hamstrung the agency or invited it to act arbitrarily by proceeding on the basis of a non-existent
database.268
The courts in some of the cases covered in our survey explicitly approved of EPA’s
reliance on conservative assumptions as a methodology that is consistent with the thrust of the
agency’s enabling statutes. The Ninth Circuit, for example, rejected an attack on EPA’s
establishment of total maximum daily loads for dioxin under the Clean Water Act. In doing so, it
noted that “EPA consistently took a conservative approach with a reasonably wide margin of
safety.”269 The courts may have been particularly likely to endorse the use of conservative
assumptions in one context if EPA balanced them with less conservative approaches elsewhere in
the decisionmaking process.270
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American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1055 (quoting NRDC v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 432
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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3.

Cases in which the Courts Struck Down EPA Decisions Based on Inadequate
Scientific Reasoning

If the courts abjure a review of EPA scientific determinations that requires a weighing or
balancing of the evidence before the agency or of competing policy considerations, then one
would expect the cases in which the courts overturned EPA’s scientific determinations to have
been decided on a more absolute basis. Thus, the courts might be willing to invalidate EPA
action in a case involving an attack on the agency’s scientific reasoning in the absence of any
supporting evidence, if EPA completely failed to explain its position, if EPA’s reasoning process
is marred by an obvious gap in logic, or if that process is internally inconsistent or inconsistent
with past practice. The cases we reviewed seem to bear out that expectation.
a.

Attacks on EPA’s Data Collection and Interpretation
(1)

Data Collection

We did not find a single case during the survey period in which the Courts of Appeals
invalidated an EPA decision based on the agency’s data collection or selection choices. The
courts seemed unwilling to interfere with this aspect of EPA’s technical expertise.
(2)

Data Interpretation

Even though the courts deferred to EPA’s interpretation of the evidence when they found
plausible evidence on both sides of an issue,271 they did not shy away from invalidating EPA
scientific determinations when they were not supported by any evidence at all.272 As the D.C.
Circuit indicated, EPA is not permitted to rely on “sheer guesswork.”273 Thus, when the
manufacturer of a chemical EPA listed as a high risk hazardous air pollutant pointed out that
EPA’s generic dispersion model assumed that the chemical acted as a gas, whereas its chemical
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A judicial determination that EPA mischaracterized the facts did not place EPA in a
better posture before the reviewing court. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 19 F.3d 1201 (7th Cir.
1994). In support of its decision denying Monsanto’s application for additional time to comply
with national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, EPA
argued that Monsanto acknowledged that carbon adsorption technology was capable of achieving
more than 95% consistent removal. Monsanto actually stated, however, that its total system,
using water scrubbing as the primary system and carbon adsorption as an additional control,
achieved that level of performance. The court found that EPA arbitrarily assumed that carbon
adsorption on its own would have achieved the same level of performance. Id. at 1207-08.
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was released as a solid, EPA responded with a “speculative factual assertion” that it was “likely”
that the chemical is emitted at temperatures higher than ambient so that it would disperse like a
gas. The D.C. Circuit disparaged that response because “it bespeaks a ‘let them eat cake’ attitude
that ill becomes an administrative agency whose obligation to the public it serves is discharged if
only it avoids being arbitrary and capricious.”274 In another case, that court held that EPA’s
adoption of a performance standard under RCRA for boilers and industrial furnaces burning
toxic organics as fuel was arbitrary and capricious because there was “no information” in the
record on the issue of whether it was feasible to comply with a standard requiring simultaneous
measurement of CO and THC. EPA “was relying on pure speculation when it decided that a
standard of no increase of CO and THC over quantifiable CO and THC baselines was
achievable.”275 In yet another case, the D.C. Circuit concluded that EPA’s justification for
applying the general waste mismanagement scenario upon which RCRA’s toxicity characteristic
leaching procedure test for assessing a chemical’s toxicity to mineral processing wastes is based
depended on speculative factual assertions. EPA took the position that small volume mineral
processing wastes could plausibly be disposed of in municipal landfills, but there was no
evidence that they ever had been. EPA also asserted that mineral processing wastes not disposed
of in municipal landfills would come into contact with some form of acidic leaching medium or
otherwise encounter environments which could cause them to leach comparable levels of toxic
constituents, but there was no evidence that they ever do come into contact with any form of
acidic leaching medium.276 Other courts were also willing to take issue with EPA’s science
under circumstances in which they concluded that the agency relied on speculation, guesswork,
or unsupported assumptions rather than on solid evidence.277
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EPA was also vulnerable in situations in which the evidence in the record supplied by the
agency’s own staff and experts contradicted its technical explanations.278 In one case, the D.C.
Circuit vacated an NPL listing that was based on one unfiltered groundwater sample in part
because EPA’s own experts recommended the use of both filtered and unfiltered tests and EPA
offered no explanation as to why it would have been infeasible to use both in this case.279 In
another, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a penalty EPA had imposed for violation of the Clean
Water Act’s dredge and fill permit requirements because statements by an EPA water quality
expert and a FWS biologist contradicted the conclusion that the wetland area in question was
suitable migratory bird habitat.280
We noted earlier that the Court of Appeals allowed EPA considerable leeway in choosing
and applying technical models for interpreting the evidence before it that were in some sense
imperfect.281 In other cases, however, the court determined that EPS’s extrapolating or modeling
choice was so ill-suited to assessing the impact of the regulated activity on health or the
environment that the conclusions EPA reached were unsupportable. The Columbia Falls case282
is illustrative. In that case, the D.C. Circuit vacated a treatment standard for hazardous waste
adopted by EPA under RCRA because EPA continued to use the toxicity characteristic leaching
procedure test to measure compliance with the standard even after it knew that the test was not an
accurate predictor of the mobility of toxic constituents in the actual leachate. The court
characterized the treatment standard as a model intended to predict the degree to which toxic
constituents will leach following disposal. It found that, “as EPA admitted, . . . the model does
not work” because the leachate generated from actual disposal of the treatment residues is more

construction activities on less than five acres are non-industrial in nature”).
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hazardous than initially anticipated.283 The test was premised on a generic mismanagement
scenario in which hazardous waste is deposited in a municipal solid waste landfill where other
wastes act as buffer agents. The waste to which EPA applied the test in that case, however, spent
potliner waste, was deposited in a monofill, which received only that waste, and where the high
pH level remained undiluted.284 In other cases, the appellate courts concluded that EPA
improperly classified drill cuttings as total suspended solids under the Clean Water Act by using
a measurement test designed to include much smaller particles,285 based its listing of a hazardous
air pollutant as high risk on the use of a generic air dispersion model that included assumptions
that EPA conceded were not accurate for the particular pollutant listed,286 and failed to
demonstrate a rational relationship between the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure test and
its application to mineral processing wastes.287
b.

Attacks on EPA’s Reasoning Process
(1)

Gaps in EPA’s Reasoning

As indicated above,288 pro-environment and pro-industry litigants in some cases were
unable to convince the courts that EPA’s scientific reasoning process lacked logic on the ground
that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of a problem. In other cases,
however, the courts took issue with EPA’s scientific determinations when EPA offered no
explanation at all of an apparently illogical conclusion (i.e., one that appeared to conflict with
common sense or with EPA’s own characterization of the facts). One of the highest profile cases
during the 1990s in which the appellate courts overturned important EPA regulatory initiatives
fell into this category of reversal based on a failure to explain a decision that appeared to fly in
the face of common sense and ordinary logic. In American Trucking, EPA decided to regulate
the coarse fraction of particulate matter indirectly, using PM10, which includes both coarse and
fine PM, as a surrogate for coarse fraction particles. EPA justified its decision by arguing that
the PM10 standard would work in conjunction with a PM2.5 standard. The court concluded that
EPA provided “no explanation” as to why use of both indicators would not lead to “double
regulation” of the PM2.5 component of PM10 and potential underregulation of the PM10-2.5
component “since the amount of PM10-2.5 permitted will always depend on the amount of PM2.5 in
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the air.”289
The courts also were confounded by EPA’s logic in other less prominent cases. In one
case, environmental groups challenged regulations in which EPA established floors for the
control of emissions by medical waste incinerators under the Clean Air Act. The D.C. Circuit
remanded the regulations for a better explanation. The court concluded that, “[e]ven under the
most deferential standard, it is difficult to accept a method under which the emissions of the bestperforming 12% of units are hypothesized to pollute nearly twice as badly as the worst of test
units that lacked any emissions controls.”290 EPA also failed to explain why it assumed that
unregulated emission units were uncontrolled, when data submitted by the American Hospital
Association seemed to indicate that many of these units used scrubbers.
The D.C. Circuit also found fault with EPA’s logic in a case in which industry challenged
EPA’s designation of a chemical as a high risk hazardous air pollutant. When the manufacturer
pointed out that the chemical it emitted would likely take the form of a rapidly settling aerosol,
rather than a gas (as EPA’s model assumed), “EPA replied in an unsupported and conclusory
fashion that it ‘still believes that the dispersion model used [is] appropriate for [assessment of the
chemical’s risk].’ This response added nothing to the agency’s defense of its thesis except
perhaps the implication that it was committed to its position regardless of any facts to the
contrary.”291 Finally, in a case in which a potentially responsible party challenged the remedial
action selected by EPA under CERCLA for the cleanup of hazardous substance contamination,
the reviewing court could make no sense of EPA’s decision to require the provision of alternative
water supplies despite the absence of any evidence that anyone was drinking contaminated water,
or even that EPA tried to learn whether anyone was doing so.292
On more than one occasion, EPA was unable to defend the reasoning process by which it
decided to place sites on CERCLA’s NPL. In Kent County,293 for example, EPA tried to justify
relying on only one unfiltered groundwater sample to score and list an NPL site by claiming that
the arsenic level in the sample was significantly higher than the arsenic level taken from an
unfiltered sample taken from a background well. But the court concluded that the explanation
“ignores the possibility that the monitoring well contained turbid water (i.e., water with soil
particles containing naturally occurring arsenic) while the background well did not. We find
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nothing in the EPA’s response that refutes this possibility.”294 The court vacated the listing.
Similarly, in National Gypsum,295 EPA acknowledged that the only kind of boron found at a site
listed on the NPL was boron oxide, which has relatively low toxicity. The agency nevertheless
assumed, with “no support for its conclusion,” that the boron identified in groundwater at the site
was of a highly toxic form simply because boron oxide is only slightly soluble in water; EPA
never even identified the type of more toxic boron compounds it presumed were formed by the
boron oxide deposited at the quarry.296 The court again vacated the listing.
Another high profile case illustrates the courts’ willingness to reverse EPA based on its
failure to provide an explanation of a conclusion that seems contradicted by EPA’s own
characterization of the evidence. In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit invalidated
EPA’s effort to phase in a ban on the use of asbestos-containing products for a plethora of
reasons. One of the flaws detected by the court related to EPA’s failure to refute a seemingly
illogical conclusion related to the comparative dangers of the banned products and their available
substitutes:
Despite this credible record evidence, by a study specifically commissioned by the
EPA, that substitute products actually might cause more deaths than those
asbestos deaths predicted by the EPA, the agency did not evaluate the dangers
posed by the substitutes, including cancer deaths from the other fibers used and
highway deaths occasioned by less effective, non-asbestos brakes. This failure to
examine the likely consequence of the EPA’s regulation renders the ban of
asbestos friction products unreasonable.297
The court also concluded that EPA’s assertion that estimates of cancer risk posed by exposure to
non-asbestos pipe substitutes were likely too high, despite data showing that the number of
cancers associated with the production of asbestos and non-asbestos pipe was similar, was based
on speculation.298
EPA’s own factual determinations proved fatal to its efforts to defend its science-based

294

Id. at 398.

295

National Gypsum Co. v. EPA, 968 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

296

Id. at 43. See also Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 935 F.3d 1321, 1323-24 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(remanding NPL listing because “the record is silent on why the lack of containment leads EPA
reasonably to expect that the arsenic will be transported via the airway path”).
297

298

Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1224 (5th Cir. 1991).

Id. at 1227.
-85-

reasoning in other cases, such as the American Lung Association case.299 A series of
environmental groups attacked EPA’s decision not to issue NAAQS for short-term, high-level
bursts of sulfur dioxide, even though EPA stated that these “documented adverse health effects . .
. should be regarded as significant from a public health standpoint” and that exposure poses “a
health threat to sensitive exposed populations.”300 In a Ninth Circuit case involving an
environmental group challenge to EPA’s issuance of stormwater discharge rules under the Clean
Water Act, the court found arbitrary EPA’s decision to exempt construction sites of less than five
acres from the stormwater permit requirement on the basis of their alleged de minimis adverse
effects. EPA itself admitted that even small construction sites can have a significant impact on
local water quality.301
In a related series of cases, the courts struck down EPA decisions because the agency
failed to provide any contemporaneous response in the record to a key question that had been
raised about the validity of a position it had adopted or had supplied to the court only a post hoc
rationalization. The D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s decision to list certain carbamate-based
products and waste streams as hazardous wastes under RCRA because EPA’s explanation
ignored one of the factors listed in its own regulations as a mandatory consideration “without a
word as to why it is irrelevant or unimportant.”302 Although its own regulations required EPA to
consider mismanagement of waste, it never responded to the charge that listing a chemical as a
hazardous waste under RCRA might actually lead to less careful treatment because listing creates
a stigma, leading some to engage in “subterfuge of regulation.”303 The court indicated that
“[w]here EPA is confronted with evidence challenging its classification, it must respond, either
by altering the class or by reasonably defending its choices.”304
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The same kind of failure to respond to key challenges to its reasoning subverted EPA’s
ability to defend its regulatory choices in other cases, too. In one D.C. Circuit case, the court
remanded portions of EPA’s risk-based caps on the concentrations of metals in sewage sludge
destined for land application that the court found to be arbitrary and capricious.305 Part of the
problem identified by the court was that “EPA chose not to respond” to the claim that the
assumptions about the rate and duration of sludge application that it relied on in calculating the
caps were irrational with respect to heat-dried sludge, which is applied at lower rates for shorter
durations than other kinds of sludge. EPA’s only explanation was that its assumptions were
“conservative.”306 In a later case, another panel of that court remanded regulations issued by
EPA under the Clean Air Act to control emissions of hazardous air pollutants from medical
waste incinerators. According to the court, EPA failed to explain why it interpreted the “best
controlled similar unit” under the statute to encompass all units using the same technology as the
unit with the best performance instead of just that unit itself. The court also took issue with
EPA’s failure to explain why it rounded numbers on observed emission levels up, “often in ways
that seem contrary to ordinary principles of rounding.”307 In a NPL listing case, the D.C. Circuit
found fault with EPA’s failure to explain the basis for its conclusion that metalloids deserved the
same persistence score under the hazard ranking system as metals do. EPA could not simply
assume, without supporting explanation, that metalloids should be treated the same as metals for
that purpose.308 In another NPL listing case, the court ordered EPA to remove a site from the list
because the missing explanation the agency gave was provided for the first time in the course of
litigation. “It [was] too late for the Agency [in the course of litigation] to base a listing on a new
theory for the source of arsenic” that might be transported away from the facility by air.309
In the section in which we analyzed the cases in which EPA prevailed against attacks on
its scientific reasoning, we found that EPA’s decisions passed muster if the courts found the
alleged defects in the agency’s explanations to be irrelevant to the reasoning process engaged in
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by the agency.310 EPA had a much more difficult time foisting off such attacks when the courts
detected internal inconsistencies in its reasoning process. In American Trucking, for example,
EPA sought to defend its decision to regulate the coarse fraction of PM10 indirectly on a
pragmatic basis. It claimed that PM10 is a better indicator than PM2.5 for coarse particulate
pollution because a nationwide monitoring program for PM10 already existed. As EPA
acknowledged elsewhere in its brief, however, previous cases barred the agency from considering
factors (such as technological feasibility) unrelated to public health in setting air quality
standards. “The administrative convenience of using PM10 cannot justify choosing an indicator
poorly matched to the relevant pollution agent.”311 In another case, EPA was unable to convince
the D.C. Circuit to sustain a hazardous waste listing. EPA ignored a regulated entity’s decision
to use lined landfills to dispose of waste, and assumed wastes would be dumped in unlined
landfills, even though it had considered as a factor that mitigated against the risk of exposure in
another aspect of the same rulemaking another entity’s decision to make considerable
investments in certain kinds of treatment systems.312 Another panel of that court vacated an NPL
listing partly because it found EPA’s argument that boron oxide deposited at the site broke down
into more toxic boron compounds to be inconsistent with its assertion that boron oxide is only
slightly soluble in water.313
We detected at least two kinds of “wild cards” in the cases in which EPA defended itself
against attacks on its scientific reasoning. When EPA could demonstrate that it provided
individual adjustment mechanisms to accommodate unique circumstances and unintended
anomalies, EPA’s chances of prevailing increased.314 Conversely, when a challenger attacked an
EPA solution without suggesting to the court a workable alternative approach, the challenger’s
likelihood of success diminished.315 A couple of additional factors seemed to enhance the
prospects of a successful attack on EPA’s scientific reasoning. First, EPA sometimes found itself
in trouble when the courts reached the conclusion that the agency had taken unwarranted short
cuts in an effort to facilitate reaching its chosen objective. In the Leather Industries case,316 the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that “[a]n agency has discretion to design rules that can be broadly
applied, sacrificing some measure of ‘fit’ for administratability. At the same time, however, an
agency must justify its failure to take account of circumstances that appear to warrant different
310
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treatment for different parties.”317 In that case, EPA crossed the line into the realm of an
unjustified short cut by failing to provide any justification for applying its assumptions
concerning the rate and duration of land application of sewage sludge to heat-dried sludge, when
it had information in the record regarding the actual rate and duration of the use of that kind of
sludge. “Given that the EPA had at hand the information necessary accurately to prevent the
known risks, it must provide some explanation for ignoring it in favor of blanket, highly
conservative assumptions.”318 The court also remanded the risk-based caps EPA had set for
selenium based on EPA’s reliance on highly conservative exposure assumptions. EPA based its
calculations on the assumption that a highly exposed individual would be a child ingesting
sewage sludge daily for up to five years. But it applied this assumption to public contact sites to
which children would not have access, such as highway medians, industrial parks, and roadside
cemeteries. “If, as [the challenger’s] practices suggest, a significant proportion of sewage sludge
application involves sites with low potential for public and child contact, then it is irrational, at
least without further explanation, to sweep these applications willy-nilly into a category based on
a high-child-exposure model.”319 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit had opined in an earlier case that
The regulatory world is replete with imperfect distinctions; the Agency’s task is to
apply them rationally in light of their imperfections. The Agency’s choice
between two less than perfect alternatives cannot be accepted by the court
uncritically, merely because the Agency acknowledges that each category is
indeed an imperfect fit for the activity in question. Rather, EPA must articulate a
reasonable justification for its choice on the basis of some policy ground or other.
It simply has not done so.320
In Corrosion Proof Fittings, when industry challenged EPA’s figures as presenting a risk
estimate that was too high, EPA conceded the validity of the criticism. Instead of recalculating
the figure, however, EPA changed an unrelated figure “to yield the same result. . . . Allowing
such behavior would require us only to focus on the final numbers provided by an agency, and to
ignore how it arrives at that number. Because a conclusion is no better than the methodology
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used to reach it, such a result cannot survive the substantial evidence test.”321 The court
obviously was not impressed by what it regarded as result-oriented behavior.
The NPL listing cases again provide evidence of a judicial distaste for avoidable shortcutting endeavors by EPA. In Tex Tin,322 EPA placed a site on the NPL on the basis of a risk that
arsenic present in tin slag piles at the site could escape into the air and be transported away from
the site. To justify that analysis, it sampled the piles and found that entrainable dust particles
were present in the slag.
The problem is that the Agency never conducted any chemical analysis to confirm
that the particles came from the tin slag. It is as if dust accumulated on an
automobile’s windshield; one could not simply infer that the dust came from the
window rather than the air. So here. Tex Tin claims — entirely plausibly, it
seems to us — that the small particles blew onto the uncovered piles from
elsewhere. The fact remains that the Agency has never documented a single speck
of dust with a chemical composition associating it with Tex Tin’s slag. Given this
gaping evidentiary hole, the Agency was not entitled merely to assume that the
untested dust particles on the tin slag pile were produced by the slag.323
In another NPL listing case,324 the D.C. Circuit found EPA’s assumption that highly toxic forms
of boron may have been deposited at the site to be
particularly frustrating because [EPA] acknowledges that tests are available to
determine the precise form of boron contained in the Salford Quarry’s
groundwater. While we do not suggest that the EPA must perform the additional
tests, we do think that if the Agency refuses to do so it must at least give a
reasoned explanation for its assumption that other boron compounds exist at the
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site. If the EPA cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for its inference that
compounds other than boron oxide exist at the site, then it must offer substantial
evidence upon which it could conclude that the highly toxic boron compounds are
present there. Because the Agency failed to do either, we are persuaded that its
decision to assign the Salford Quarry a toxicity value of 3 was arbitrary and
capricious.325
The NPL listing cases also illustrate the second wild card. The courts tended to be less
favorably inclined (and less deferential) toward EPA’s scientific determinations if they became
convinced that EPA had developed a pattern of repeating the same mistakes. In the second Tex
Tin case, the D.C. Circuit found itself “confronted with a state of affairs reminiscent of Tex Tin I.
Then, as now, we had only the Agency’s ‘conclusory statements’ to weigh against specific
scientific evidence Tex Tin provided.”326 In the National Gypsum case decided the previous year,
the court deemed EPA to be “unwilling to support its decisions with the necessary scientific
findings. In yet another case involving the EPA and its National Priorities List (NPL), we have
before us a petition for review challenging the agency’s decision to list . . . a waste site located in
Pennsylvania. As we have had to do in several recent cases, . . . we vacate the listing decision
and remand to the EPA. . . .”327 Essentially, the D.C. Circuit in cases like these got fed up with
chastising the agency for employing the same indefensible methodologies.
(2)

Consistency of EPA’s Reasoning with the Statute

The final category of cases in which the courts invalidated EPA’s decisions based on
inadequacies in the agency’s reasoning involved situations in which EPA’s reasoning conflicted
with its own stated intentions or with its interpretation of the applicable authorizing legislation,
represented an unexplained departure from past practice or from established agency policy, or
resulted in what the courts regarded as unfair treatment of regulated entities.
The Monsanto case328 provides an illustration of both the first and third of these three
situations. The court found EPA’s denial of the company’s request for additional time to comply
with the Clean Air Act’s national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants to be arbitrary
and capricious. The need for additional time was caused by the company’s initial attempt to use
an approach to emission control that would have maximized the recycling and reuse of benzene
instead of a more conventional end-of-pipe technology. Monsanto applied for the extension only
after it discovered that the technology initially chosen (and endorsed by EPA) did not work as
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well as predicted. EPA denied the extension even though Monsanto chose the initial water
scrubber technology to comply with EPA’s own pollution prevention policy. The issue, as the
court saw it, was “whether the EPA should follow its pollution prevention policy by allowing
Monsanto to choose the control strategy that was designed to meet the benzene standard in the
most environmentally sound manner or whether Monsanto was required to use the carbon
adsorption strategy” to which it eventually turned as a backup. EPA essentially was trying,
unfairly in the court’s view, to punish Monsanto for trying (unsuccessfully) what had appeared to
both regulated entity and agency to be an environmentally superior alternative.329 And the
agency’s approach offended the court’s conception of good environmental policy to boot.
EPA seems to be saying that if a “quick fix” is available, sources are required to
employ that “quick fix” without regard to the adverse environmental
ramifications. This viewpoint is short-sighted and bad environmental policy.
Instead of eliminating an environmental problem, the EPA’s “quick fix” would
merely change the form of the problem — i.e., it would remove the environmental
hazard from the air but create a hazardous waste disposal problem.330
EPA was taken to task in other cases for engaging in reasoning that conflicted with its
own stated intentions or with its interpretation of applicable authorizing legislation. In a case in
which industry attacked a hazardous waste listing under RCRA, for example, EPA regulations
required EPA to consider the effects of mismanagement in determining whether to list a waste.
EPA assumed open-tank disposal of a particular waste, even though it conceded that the
regulated entity invariably used a closed process, because there was a possibility it would change
its practices. According to the D.C. Circuit, “EPA seems to have turned mismanagement factors
upside down, from an inquiry into whether dangerous mismanagement practices are ‘plausible, as
[the regulation] says, into an inquiry into whether they have been ruled out absolutely. This is
simply disregard of the agency’s own rule.”331 In another RCRA case, EPA subjected some
ignitable hazardous wastes to the deactivation standard, even though it had interpreted the statute
as requiring removal of a waste’s characteristic and the reduction of other hazardous constituents,
and even though it conceded that hazardous constituents remained present in some ignitable
wastes it had subjected to the deactivation standard.332 In a Clean Air Act case, EPA had
committed to designating as a high risk pollutant only those substances associated with a serious
health effect. The agency nevertheless proceeded to list MDI, a pollutant whose only known
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health effect was non-serious.333
Unexplained departures by EPA from its own past practice proved just as hazardous to
EPA’s litigation success rate as did conflicts with the agency’s stated intentions or with
applicable authorizing legislation. In one case, for example, the D.C. Circuit remanded for
further consideration EPA’s placement of a chemical on the toxic release inventory under
EPCRA because the studies EPA relied on as indicative of chronic adverse health effects did not
satisfy EPA’s own guidelines for acceptable standard protocol for laboratory tests.334 The
ubiquitous NPL listing cases provide further examples of this point.335
The Monsanto case discussed above336 illustrates the willingness of the courts to use
equity-based considerations to trump EPA’s technical explanations. In another case, the First
Circuit deemed irrational and “manifestly arbitrary and capricious” EPA’s refusal to defer the
issuance of a Clean Water Act permit that did not contain a mixing zone analysis when the state
agency had just issued a new mixing zone policy, failed to include it in its state certification, but
requested that EPA defer its ruling so that it could amend the certification to conform to the new
policy. The court accused EPA of “an element of apparent irrational discrimination.”337
V.

CONCLUSION

In the article we wrote upon the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of EPA’s creation,
we found that the courts had responded to conflicting signals from the Supreme Court as to the
appropriate degree of deference to be afforded in the course of judicial review of agency statutory
implementation decisions by striking a balance between removing themselves from policy
decisions and retaining a meaningful role in overseeing agency implementation decisions.338 The
cases decided during the 1990s reveal that the Courts of Appeals still appear to be trying to
maintain that rather precarious balance.
With respect to questions of statutory interpretation, the Courts of Appeals have not
implemented the Chevron doctrine as if it were an instruction to grant agencies almost complete
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freedom to determine the direction of policy, checked only in the rare cases in which Congress
has enacted statutory language directly contrary to the agency choice. So the view of Chevron as
sending a strong deference signal has not been borne out in its implementation. Unwilling to
capitulate to the “virtually limitless hegemony”339 such an approach would bestow on agencies,
courts read statutes, often with the assistance of clarity-producing tools of construction, so as to
provide a check on agency freedom. At the same time, judicial reluctance to second-guess
agency policy choices, or to resolve disputes involving questions of degree, practically ensures
that such judicial superintendence as occurs will take place at Step One of the Chevron analysis,
and not at Step Two.
Within the Step One cases, the decisions we have examined here also show evidence of
the further overlay of the contending views concerning the use and usefulness of legislative
history as an interpretive aid. Justice Scalia’s contention that a textualist judge can find meaning
in the text “more often” than one might suppose requires the use of rules of interpretation that
lead to clarity-producing results. The cases we have examined reveal a pattern of such results. In
contrast, EPA’s interest in finding ambiguity in statutes where that is necessary to give effect to
its autonomous views – views which we have argued are an inevitable and a legitimate
consequence of implementing policy through administrative agencies – suggests that the agency
and the courts will continue to clash on questions of interpretation.
Turning to the challenges to EPA’s science, attacks on EPA’s scientific methodologies
or reasoning process succeed in what is perhaps a surprisingly high percentage of the cases, given
the judges’ protestations of scientific illiteracy and relative incompetence. In case after case, the
courts continue to make statements to the effect that they may not substitute their judgment for
that of EPA when the agency’s “expertise is heavily implicated,”340 that an “extra measure of
deference” is due to the agency when it resolves factual questions involving scientific matters
within its area of expertise,341 or that “the complex nature of environmental statutes and
regulations” invokes the need for “specialized knowledge” on the part of EPA.342
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EPA, 129 F.3d 631, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Southwestern Pennsylvania Growth Alliance v.
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On the other hand, industry prevailed in nearly half of the cases in which it charged that
EPA provided an inadequate explanation for its decision and both pro-industry and proenvironmental litigants succeeded in a remarkably high percentage of the cases in which they
leveled attacks on EPA’s science based on defects in the agency’s explanations for its
decisions.343 The key to reconciling the sentiments with the case results may lie in a pair of
statements made by the D.C. Circuit. The court in a 1992 decision stated that “[h]appily, it is not
for the judicial branch to undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific evidence.
Our review aims only to discern whether the agency’s evaluation was rational.”344 The cases we
reviewed in this section reveal that the Courts of Appeals during the 1990s have indeed been
wary about making comparative judgments and for that reason do not typically question EPA’s
evidentiary choices or second-guess the agency in its readings of the weight of the scientific
evidence.
A second panel of the D.C. Circuit also stated, however, that, despite their lack of
expertise, the courts “cannot defer to agency expertise that was never explained.”345 For that
reason, the courts have not been hesitant during the past decade to inflict defeat upon EPA when
the agency provides no evidence at all to support its technical determinations, relies on evidence
that conflicts with the stated views of its own experts, employs technical models or
methodologies that are obviously ill-suited to assessing the impact of the regulated activity on the
environment, fails to explain in any way an apparently illogical conclusion, is silent in the face of
a pointed and relevant question about the logic of its reasoning, or engages in internally
inconsistent reasoning or reasoning that for unstated reasons conflicts with the agency’s own
previous practice. None of these tasks involves the kind of comparative evaluation that the
courts feel ill-equipped to perform and consequently have foresworn.
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